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To the millions of Egyptians who may have left their home
but whose hearts are still there
and who continue to work and hope for a better Egypt…
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ABSTRACT

Viewed within the context of an increasingly transnational world, diasporas have become crucial
development actors for their respective home countries contributing to the transfer of essential
financial, social, and human capital. The level and impact of diasporic contributions to homeland
development have been found to depend on multiple variables, of which perhaps most relevant to
policy makers in developing countries, is government policy towards emigration in general and
the diaspora in specific. Although Egypt has a sizable diaspora with a relatively high skill level,
the potential of its diaspora seems unrealized especially in regards to the role it could play in
transferring essential skills, knowledge, and expertise to Egypt.

Hence, this thesis has examined Egypt’s emigration and diaspora policy in an effort to determine
whether or not Egyptian government policies, in both formulation and implementation, are
conducive towards diaspora engagement in general and knowledge transfer in specific. Using
Alan Gamlen’s concept of transnational governmentality and his impending policy typology, this
thesis first examined Egypt’s diaspora engagement policies and then examined Egypt’s
knowledge transfer programs. Egyptian policy documents were analyzed and interviews with
Egyptian policymakers, former government officials, and experts were conducted.

This thesis found that Egyptian government policies towards the diaspora do not compose a well
formulated and comprehensive policy framework. Policies and programs aimed at diaspora
engagement and knowledge transfer are not implemented as they are formulated. Consequently,
Egyptian government policy does not seem conducive towards any serious knowledge transfer

from the diaspora. Policy recommendations for more effective diaspora engagement and
knowledge transfer policy are also shared.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The two-way relationship between international migration and development, also known as the
migration development nexus, is far from a straightforward one. Attempts to analyze the link
between the two have concentrated on a variety of facets such as the effect of migration on laborreceiving countries, the effect of labor-sending countries’ development (or lack thereof) on
migration flows, or the effect of emigration on the development of labor-sending countries. It is
perhaps this last facet that is most relevant to labor-sending countries such as Egypt.

Over the past decade, a consensus seems to have emerged about the potentially positive effect
emigration can have on the development of labor-sending countries. Emigration, and more
specifically diasporas (defined here as ethnic minority groups of migrants and their descendants
who are living in a host country but still maintain to some degree social or emotional ties with
their homeland) are currently seen as having the potential to fuel the development of these
countries1. This increasing optimism can be traced to the emergence of the field of
transnationalism. Transnationalism is defined as the process “whereby transmigrants forge and
sustain multi-stranded social relations that connect their societies of origin with the societies of
settlement. Consequently, they build social fields that enable them to maintain multiple
relationships – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political – that span

1

Hein De Haas, "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective," The International Migration Review
44(1) (2010): 227.

borders”2. Basically, globalization and accompanying technological changes are believed to
have transformed migrants and their progeny into diasporas that are capable of continuing to
positively take part in processes ongoing in their nation of origin. It is this underlying idea that
forms the basis of this thesis’ conceptual framework referred to as transnationalizing
governmentality which will be later discussed in chapter 2.

Much attention has since been given to diasporas; they are becoming increasingly recognized for
the vital financial, human, and social capital that they possess3. The existence of such rich
resources within the diaspora and the diasporas’ ability to transfer these resources, as a result of
today’s highly transnational world, has transformed diasporas into crucial development actors.
Engaging these diasporas especially at the more profound level of facilitating knowledge transfer
i.e. the transfer of information, skills, experience, and technology by the diaspora to bodies and
institutions in the homeland, as opposed to just seeking their remittances and investments, has
become the subject of much interest. Various efforts have therefore been spent on determining
the different variables that determine the nature and level of diaspora engagement.

Although various determinants have been identified (see section 2.1.3), home government policy
towards the diaspora has emerged as a decisive factor in determining the extent of diaspora
engagement and the type of capital transfer that takes place. Apparent both in the literature and
in the experiences of various countries, government policy is crucial to the realization of higher-

2

Charles Green, Globalization and Survival in the Black Diaspora: The New Urban Challenge, (Albany: State
University of New York Press), 1997, 174.
3

Dina Ionescu, Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for
Policymakers (Geneva: The International Organization for Migration), 2006.

impact forms of diaspora contributions such as human capital contributions. Some policy makers
have actually recognized the ability of their highly skilled diasporas (composed of a high
percentage of migrants with at least a tertiary education) to contribute knowledge, skills, and
expertise even without returning to home country development and have worked to make this a
reality4. Several countries, most notably China and India, have pursued specific diaspora
engagement policies that have enabled them to successfully mobilize their diasporas and benefit
from their diasporas’ rich human capital.

Even though Egypt is a major labor-sending country with a sizable diaspora (estimates of the
Egyptian diaspora currently range between 3 and 8 million5), it does not seem to have benefited
from its diaspora as have some other developing countries. The results of diaspora engagement
have been mainly limited to financial capital transfers in the predominant form of remittances
which were approximately $7.1 billion through formal channels in 20096 and an estimated $2-2.5
million through informal channels7. Remittances are the second source of foreign currency for
Egypt exceeding the revenues of the Suez Canal for example. They have also composed 4 per
cent of GDP in 2009 which points to how important remittances are for the Egyptian
government.8 There has also been some diaspora philanthropy such as the well-documented case

4

Martin Grossman, “Diaspora Knowledge Flows in the Global Economy,” (paper presented in E-Leader
Conference,) Budapest, 2010, 3.
5

Omar Ashour, "ElBaradei and the Mobilization of the Egyptian Diaspora,” last modified September 2010,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/29/elbaradei-andmobilization-of-egyptian-diaspora/6bwg.
6

The World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2011).

7

Minessy, Mohamed. Interview by Iman Dawood. Cairo, Egypt. April 9, 2012.

8

World Bank, “Migration.”

of the Coptic Orphans9 and a limited volume of investments by the Egyptian diaspora10. Higherimpact forms of diaspora contributions with potentially more impact on Egypt’s development
such as human capital transfers, though, seem to have been quite minimal11. This is not a result
of the limited skills available in the Egyptian diaspora, as there is no doubt that the Egyptian
diaspora is in fact burgeoning with many resources of which is a priceless pool of knowledge,
skills, and expertise that has the potential to spur Egypt’s transformation into a competitive
country in today’s knowledge economy.

Although the exact educational and skill attainment level of the Egyptian diaspora is difficult to
calculate due to the lack of complete and up-to-date data about the subject; the overall
educational and skill profile of Egyptian migrants points to a diaspora with a relatively high
level—especially when compared to the profile of Egyptians in Egypt (see section 3.6). Studies
conducted to gauge the extent of the Egyptian diaspora’s human capital contributions also
confirm the existence of much unrealized yet rich human capital in the Egyptian diaspora. A
report conducted by the United Nations in Egypt in 2011 titled “ICT Policy Review” refers to
this unfortunate state when it highlights the “untapped potential represented by Egyptian experts
in the diaspora12”. Likewise, Dina Mehrez and Hadia Hamdy in their study titled “Skilled

9

Jennifer M Brinkerhoff, "Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society: The Case of Coptic Orphans in Egypt,"
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 37, no. 3 (2008): 411-433.
10

"Migration and Development in Egypt," The International Organization for Migration,
http://www.egypt.iom.int/Doc/IOM Migration and Development in Egypt Facts and Figures (English).pdf (accessed
April 25, 2012).
11

Hadia Hamdy and Dina Mehrez, "Skilled Egyptian Contributions to Development," Education, Business and
Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues 3 no. 4 (2010): 250-261.
12

United Nations, "ICT Policy Review," last modified October 25, 2011, UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dtlstict2011d6summary_en.pdf (accessed March 25, 2012).

Egyptian Diaspora Contributions to Egypt” emphasize that although the highly skilled Egyptian
diaspora does make some contributions to Egypt’s development, its potential is not “fully
utilized”13.

Such a state requires that attention be devoted to the topic of the highly skilled diaspora’s
engagement and particularly the transfer of the diaspora’s human capital. Keeping in mind the
demonstrated importance of government policy in bringing about higher impact forms of
diaspora engagement, an examination of Egyptian government policy is essential. No studies to
our knowledge, however, have been conducted towards this end. Hence, in order to better
understand the situation at hand this thesis aims to examine Egyptian government policies
towards the diaspora in order to ascertain whether or not they produce a comprehensive policy
framework that enables the diaspora’s engagement, results in higher-impact forms of human
capital and knowledge transfers, and facilitates the positive role the diaspora could play in
Egypt’s development.

1.2 Research Questions
The thesis is therefore concerned with answering four main questions. The thesis’s first question
is what are the Egyptian government policies towards highly skilled emigration in general and
more specifically towards the diaspora? And also do these policies compose a comprehensive
policy framework? The next question asks whether the Egyptian government policies under
question are actually implemented as formulated. The third question is then are these policies
conducive to the highly skilled diaspora’s engagement and to the transfer of its human capital for
the purposes of Egypt’s development? Finally, the last question is, based on the answers of the
13

Hadia Hamdy and Dina Mehrez, “Skilled Egyptian,” 250.

first three research questions, what recommendations can be made for Egyptian policy makers in
order to develop a more elaborate and comprehensive approach to Egyptian diaspora engagement
and to maximize the Egyptian diaspora’s potential contribution to development especially via
knowledge transfer?

1.3 Hypothesis
The initial hypothesis of this research is that current Egyptian policy towards highly skilled
emigration is one of nonchalance towards the loss of Egyptian brains stemming from the low
demand for such highly-skilled labor in the Egyptian economy. Instead, Egyptian policy makers
currently see highly skilled emigration as merely a means of reducing unemployment at home
and see ensuing remittances as a crucial source of foreign exchange that exceeds other sources of
foreign exchange such as the Suez Canal. Policies may aim at engaging the diaspora, however,
the focus of these policies will primarily be financial in nature with the objective of facilitating
remittance transfers and investment. If some formulated policies are aimed at benefiting from the
diaspora’s rich human capital, it is unlikely that they are actually being implemented as
formulated due to negligence of the Egyptian government, inefficient bureaucracy, and the
generally deficient nature of Egyptian institutions. It seems as though Egypt’s policies in this
aspect, although may exist, are incomplete and do not compose a comprehensive and effective
policy framework.

The result of this is that Egyptian government policies are not conducive towards diaspora
engagement in general but even less so towards knowledge transfer in specific. Consequently,
the potential benefits that could be derived from the highly skilled diaspora are largely

unrealized. This obstructs the diaspora’s involvement in Egypt’s development even if the ability
of and motivation from the Egyptian diaspora is present.

Therefore, Egypt’s migration and diaspora engagement policies must be adjusted and
implemented in a different manner to reflect their current shortcomings. A comprehensive policy
framework should be formulated and implemented in an effective way. This no doubt requires
greater communication and coordination between the different relevant policy making and
implementing institutions. Specific policies aimed at engaging the diaspora and transferring its
knowledge should be at the core of this policy framework in order for Egypt’s diaspora to have a
chance to propel Egypt forward in today’s knowledge-based world.

1.4 Methodology
To answer the research questions above, this thesis utilized two main research methods:
document analysis and interviews.

The first research method used was that of document analysis. Document analysis was employed
to explore Egyptian government policy towards the diaspora and specifically the highly skilled
diaspora. Various documents were collected and analyzed by the researcher. The documents
analyzed were: laws, ministerial publications, ministerial websites, project documents,
governmental news articles, conference agendas and proceedings, newsletters, and government
presentations. These documents were mainly from three ministries relevant to diaspora
engagement and knowledge transfer: the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (MME), the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific

Research (MOHESR). Documents form other government agencies were also at times consulted
when necessary. Each document was examined as an independent document but also as a
document within a larger pool of documents so as to be able to determine whether or not the
different elements of Egypt’s diaspora policy are aligned and coordinated or whether they are
fragmented and ineffective.

The second research method employed was that of interviews. This research method allowed us
to better explore Egyptian government policy towards the diaspora by filling in the gaps
remaining following document analysis. Unstructured interviews were conducted with three
groups of people. The first group of people consisted of senior officials of the Egyptian
government currently employed in the MME, the MOFA, and the MOHESR. The second group
of people interviewed consisted of former members of these ministries. Finally, the third group
with which interviews were conducted consisted of experts on Egyptian migration and on
knowledge transfer in Egypt. A total of ten interviews were conducted. These interviews were
aimed at tying together the information obtained through document analysis, learning how the
various policies and programs of the Egyptian government are actually implemented in reality,
and finally benefiting from the experience of policy makers and experts who are able to offer
constructive recommendations for improvements in Egyptian government policy.

1.5 Thesis Structure
This chapter mainly introduced the topic of this research and presented the need for further
research into Egyptian government policies related to the diaspora’s engagement and particularly

the diaspora’s human capital transfers. The main research questions, hypothesis, and
methodology were also noted.

In chapter 2, the literature relevant to the migration-development nexus and to diasporas as
actors in a transnational world will be reviewed. The chapter will also review the literature
published on different diaspora engagement impact levels and their determining factors. Finally
the literature review will introduce successful country experiences of China and India as well as
the specific policies of diaspora engagement that they followed. This chapter will then conclude
by setting the conceptual framework for this thesis which is that of “transnational
governmentality.” The last section of the chapter will also review Alan Gamlen’s policy
typology that has been used to examine Egypt’s policies towards the diaspora.

Chapter 3 is a historical chapter that will review Egyptian highly skilled migration patterns as
well as Egyptian government policies towards emigration. It will review the five phases of
Egyptian migration which are: the phase prior to 1974, the phase of expansion from 1974-1984,
the phase of contraction from 1984-1988, the phase of deterioration from 1988-1992, and the
current phase.

Chapter 4 will present and analyze the data collected for this research about the different
capacity building and extending rights policies (see section 2.2.2 for definitions) of the Egyptian
government particularly the MOFE, MME, and the MOHESR. The first part of the chapter will
examine the different policies and programs of the Egyptian government that are meant to
symbolically build a nation as well as the institutions that are meant to help govern the diaspora.

The second part of the chapter will then look at the policies and programs of the Egyptian
government that are meant to extend political, social, and civil rights to the diaspora. The ability
of the government to implement these policies as was originally formulated will also be noted.

Chapter 5 will then present and analyze the data collected for this research about the extracting
obligations and investment policy type in general and the knowledge transfer policy type in
specific (see section 2.2.2 for definitions of these terms). The beginning of the chapter will look
at Egyptian government policy towards the highly skilled diaspora and its human capital. The
rest of the chapter will then examine each of the knowledge transfer programs implemented by
various bodies of the Egyptian government. Particular attention will be paid to whether these
programs are in fact conducive towards knowledge transfer from the diaspora.

Finally, chapter 6 will then conclude by summarizing the findings of this thesis. It will then offer
specific policy recommendations for a comprehensive diaspora engagement strategy that can
amplify the role of the Egyptian highly skilled diaspora in Egypt’s development particularly
through knowledge transfer. Limitations of this thesis and ideas for further research will also be
shared.

1.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the topic at hand pointing to the benefits that can be amassed from the
engagement of a country’s diaspora in today’s transnational world. Because Egypt does not seem
to be benefiting from its sizable and rich highly skilled diaspora, we expressed that it is
necessary to examine the different factors that determine Egypt’s level of diaspora engagement

of which is the understudied yet extremely crucial aspect of government policy towards highly
skilled emigration and the diaspora. We stated the thesis’s main research questions, its
hypothesis, and its methodology. We also clarified that the main aim of this thesis is the
examination of Egyptian government policy in order to determine whether or not it is conducive
towards diaspora engagement in general and knowledge transfer in specific.

A note must be mentioned here about the limitations of this research. First off, the paucity of
data on Egyptian migration and the Egyptian diaspora must be noted. Estimates of the size of the
Egyptian diaspora vary by the millions. Even estimates offered by different official sources of
the Egyptian government such as the MME and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
Statistics (CAPMAS) vary greatly (see section 3.6 for more information). Likewise, information
about the different phases of Egyptian emigration through the years is not extensive. This is also
the case with Egyptian policy documents—the Egyptian government either does not make public
or simply does not possess that many written documents. Hence, this thesis had to complement
document analysis with interviews with public officials in various policy-making and
implementing ministries to be able to gain an accurate understanding of the situation.

It is also important to note that this thesis is mainly focused on examining Egypt’s formulated
policies towards highly skilled emigration and the diaspora. It will also look at government
initiatives that have resulted from these policies; however, it will not be able to fully judge the
effectiveness of these initiatives. Such an appraisal is beyond the scope of this thesis;
nevertheless, the thesis will allude to whether or not policies have been implemented as

formulated in order to see whether or not the Egyptian policies are conducive towards diaspora
engagement and knowledge transfer.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review
In order to better understand the role of diasporas especially in relation to the development of
their home countries via the transfer of essential human capital, it is important to review the
literature published about the migration development-nexus in general and diasporas in specific.
It is also important to review authors’ conceptions about the different levels of diaspora
engagement as well as the factors that determine these different levels of diaspora engagement
and their impact on home country development. This literature review will begin in this way and
will end with perhaps what is the most crucial segment of the literature: the role of labor-sending
countries’ government policies towards the diaspora in successfully engaging diasporas and in
achieving knowledge transfer. The last section of the literature review will then look more
specifically at the diaspora engagement policies pursued by different governments (of China and
India) towards this end.

2.1.1 Introduction: The Migration-Development Nexus
Much has been written throughout the past couple decades about the relationship between
migration and development. This two-way relationship, usually referred to as the migrationdevelopment nexus, is composed of the effects of migration on the development of laborsending/receiving countries and of the effects of imbalances in development on migration. Of
particular relevance to this study is the literature written about the effect of emigration on the
development of labor-sending countries. As with most complex relationships, assessments

regarding this two-way relationship have varied over time—often influenced by the current
historical moment and circumstances14. For the purposes of clarifying some of the trends or
phases that have developed through the years, it is possible and useful to divide literature about
the migration-development nexus into three phases as Hein De Haas has done in his article
“Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective”.

During the first phase, which lasted until about 1973, the dominant views on the subject were
based on the experiences of emigration from Europe to the US and from Eastern and Southern
Europe to Western Europe (often through guest worker programs) during the post-World War II
era and were consequently quite optimistic. Neoclassical theories at the time perceived migration
positively advocating it as a tool for the optimal allocation of production factors to the benefit of
both sending and receiving countries15. Rooted in the theoretical framework of modernization
theory, migration was seen as being capable of helping developing countries in their
development take-off. Kindleberger, for instance, wrote about the ability of financial
remittances, return migration, and skills and knowledge transfers to contribute to the South’s
development. Kindleberger adamantly argued that “large-scale emigration can contribute to the
best of both worlds: rapid growth in the country of immigration . . . and rapid growth in the
country of origin”16. G. Beijer also shared Kindleberger’s view arguing in his article

14

Ninna Nyberg-Sørensen, Nicholas Van Hear, and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, “The Migration – Development
Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options” International Migration 40, no. 5 (2002): 7.
15

16

Hein De Haas, “Migration and Development,” 5.

Charles P. Kindleberger, Europe’s Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1965) 253.

“International and National Migratory Movements” that migrants were “a hope for the industrial
development of their native land”17.

This phase of optimism, however, was replaced during the mid-1970s by more negative views on
the migration development nexus. Influenced, at least in part, by neo-Marxist theories such as
dependency theory and world system’s theory prevalent at this time, migration was seen as
undermining regional and national economies by depriving them of their valuable human and
material capital resources which are exploited for the benefit of industrialized countries in need
of cheap migrant labor18. Papademetriou, for example, argues that it could lead to “an
uncontrolled depletion of their [labor-sending countries’] already meager supplies of skilled
manpower - and the most healthy, dynamic, and productive members of their populations”19. It is
also during this phase that literature about the brain drain became popular. The emigration of
skilled sectors of the population of developing countries were seen as depriving poor countries of
the already scarce skilled and professional labor resources in which developing countries had
already invested many years of education20. Literature published about remittances was also
quite negative during this time with studies pointing to the tendency of remittances to go towards
consumption and rarely contributing to productive investment21. Migration was also seen as a
contributor to inequality since remittances were accruing to those who were already better off22.

17

G. Beijer, “International and National Migratory Movements,” International Migration 8, no. 3 (1970): 102.

18

Hein De Haas, “Migration and Development,” 6-8.

19

D. G. Papademetriou, "Illusions and Reality in International Migration: Migration and
Development in Post-World War II Greece," International Migration 23, no.2 (1985): 111-112.
20

George B. Baldwin, “Brain Drain or Overflow,” Foreign Affairs 48, no. 2 (1970): 358-372.

21

Oded Stark and David Levhari, "On Migration and Risk in LDCs," Economic Development

The third and current phase, referred to briefly in the introduction, is grounded in the theoretical
framework of transnationalism and has corresponded with the paradigm shift towards more
pluralistic approaches that take into account agency and structure23. Literature published in this
phase views migration more positively; migration should fuel the development of labor-sending
countries not only via financial remittances, but also via knowledge flows and positive social
remittances24. Perhaps among the first to explore the applicability of a transnational framework
to migration is Nina Schiller in “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational
Migration”25. Her idea is that globalization and accompanying technological changes allow
migrants to continue to take part in processes ongoing in their nation of origin. This moves the
analysis beyond issues such as “remittances” and “return migration.” Migrants do not need to
return to positively contribute to their countries26. Much literature has consequently been
published about diasporas, instead of return migrants, because they are believed to be “at the
core of the transnational global landscape” and possess a variety of links with their home
countries that “engenders a web of transformations within countries’ economies and societies”27.
and Cultural Change 31, no 1 (1982): 191-196.
22

Michael Lipton, "Migration From the Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and
Income Distribution," World Development 8, no.1 (1980): 1-24.
23

Hein De Haas, “Migration and Development,” 15.

24

Samuel M. Maimbo and Dillip Ratha, Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects, (Washington
D.C: World Bank, 2005).
25

Nina G Schiller, “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,”
Anthropological Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1995): 48.
26
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It is also interesting to note that during this phase, and specifically during the 1990s, a “brain
gain” theory also emerged which suggested that the prospects of migration raise the expected
return to education and consequently higher levels of education are sought in developing
countries and brain gain results28. The soundness of this theory is contested however. Therefore,
let us return to the transnational nature of today’s world and the role of diasporas in it.

2.1.2 Diasporas as Development Actors in a Transnational World
Diasporas are being increasingly seen as important for the development of their home countries
in the literature. Although there is no single accepted definition of the term diaspora, “new”
definitions have recently evolved to reflect the transnational era. In the mid-eighties the term
began to take on a new meaning where it refers to “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins
residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with
their countries of origin—their homelands”29. Ionescu also defines the term in a similar manner
explaining that the term “diasporas” conveys the idea of transnational populations, living in one
place, while still maintaining relations with their homelands, being both “here” and “there”30.
The term diaspora is preferred, in the literature and this thesis, to migrants because it applies to
expatriate populations abroad and generations born abroad to foreign parents who are or may be
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citizens of their countries of residence but may nevertheless wish to continue to support their
home country development31.

The literature points to mainly three types of capital (financial, social, and human) that diasporas
possess and that can be useful for home countries that desire to actively engage their diasporas.
Financial capital transfers discussed in the literature have varied taking different forms such as
that of foreign direct investments (FDI), trade, remittances, savings, start-up or business
investments, purchase of real estate and humanitarian support. In more recent years some authors
have also written about social capital transfers which refer to social remittances composed of
ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country
communities. Social remittances can be transferred through the diaspora in different ways, be
received by members of the home country, and affect social values and lifestyles in home
countries32. Finally, scholars have also written about the diaspora’s human capital which refers to
the levels of education, training, skills and knowledge available in a diaspora that might be
drawn on for home-country development initiatives33. This definition of human capital is the one
we have adopted for the purposes of this thesis. Methods of transferring this human capital
include brain circulation or circulation of skills, technology transfer, virtual participation,
diaspora networks, temporary return, and skill-matching programs, banks or databases34.
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Since this thesis is mainly interested in the human capital transfers of the diaspora, it is important
to mention the limitations of the use of this term. It is understood that this human capital, as
explicated in human capital theory, allows people to be more productive and contributes
significantly to the economic growth of a country. Thus, it is understood that if home countries
engage their diasporas and facilitate the diasporas’ human capital contributions this will aid in
countries’ economic development. It is important to keep in mind though that the theory of
human capital is not uncontroversial and that some such as Mark Blaug, for example, have
highlighted the limitations of this idea. Blaug contends that “it has to be said that the models so
far examined in the growth accounting literature fail utterly to explain the mechanism by which
this effect is produced.35” It is important to keep in mind that while economic growth emanates
from education and knowledge, it does so from many other things. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny
that knowledge, skills, and expertise are not essential to a country’s development—especially in
the case of Egypt where human capital is an oft-neglected aspect of government policy.

2.1.3 Diaspora Impact Levels & Determining Factors
As briefly mentioned above, there are different types of diasporic capital transfers which tend to
have varying effects on home country development. It is hence useful to refer to literature
published on diaspora impact levels so as to understand the impact these different transfers can
have on home country development.
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Of the literature published on the different levels of diaspora impact, perhaps Yevgeny
Kuznetsov most clearly identifies the different levels. In his paper, titled “Why is Diaspora
Potential so Elusive?” he refers to five different levels of diaspora impact; they are remittances,
donations, investments, knowledge, and institutional development and reform. Kuznetsov
illustrates these different levels of diaspora impact in a hierarchical pyramid form starting with a
subsistence agenda (remittances) at the bottom and ending with a self-actualization agenda
(institutional development and reform) at the top—as can be seen in the figure below.36 Of these
levels, the first three clearly refer to financial capital transfers (remittances, donations, and
investments). The higher levels of the pyramid and particularly the fourth level of the pyramid
relates to maximizing the positive impact of the diaspora’s human capital contributions and
hence is the main focus of this study.
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of Diaspora Impact
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and Innovation Networks
(3) Investments
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(1) Remittances

Source: Yevgeny Kuznetsov, "Why is Diaspora Potential so Elusive? Towards a New Generation of Initiatives to
Leverage Countries’ Talent Abroad," (paper published by the World Bank Institute) New York, 2009.

As apparent in Kuznetsov’s pyramid above, different types of capital transfers can have widely
different effects on home country development. Not surprisingly then, attention has been given
in the literature to the different factors responsible for determining a country’s engagement level
with the diaspora and the resulting impact.

Perhaps of the first literature published on diaspora engagement levels and the determinants of
these different levels is Milton Esman’s work. In it Esman identifies three different factors he
believes are responsible for shaping the level of impact of the diaspora’s contribution to its
homeland. These three factors are: the diaspora’s ability to mobilize, the opportunity

structures/context, and finally their motivation to act37. The first factor refers to the need for a
sense of solidarity and community identity amongst the diaspora in order for the diaspora to be
able to contribute. King and Melvin have also written about the importance of this factor years
later38. Esman’s second factor refers to the opportunity structure or the context that shapes the
diaspora’s mobilization. Jennifer Brinkerhoff also later expanded on Esman’s work by
mentioning the availability of economic opportunities, access to necessary infrastructure
(political, technical, informational/communication) and government support as important
elements of this second factor.39 Finally, the third factor according to Esman is “their [the
diaspora’s] inclination or motivation to maintain their solidarity and exert group influence.”40
Clearly, all these factors play an important role in shaping the nature of diaspora engagement.

Devish Kapur also outlines several factors that play a part in determining diaspora engagement
levels in his article “Diasporas and Technology Transfer.” Speaking specifically about how to
achieve the level of technology transfer (level four in Kuznetsov’s hierarchy) Kapur identifies
factors he believes are “most important in affecting a diaspora’s role.”41 He divides these factors
into four main categories: a) factors that contribute to the potential importance of diaspora such
as its size, education/skill, income, the activities in which it is engage, and b) factors that
37
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contribute to the realized influence of the diaspora such as host country characteristics and home
country characteristics such as policies c) the degree of formality of diaspora channels and
finally d) the demand stemming from the source country i.e. their willingness and openness to
benefit from the diaspora.42

Although Esman and Kapur’s sets of factors are not identical, they do share many similarities.
The first factor or set of factors in both Kapur and Esman’s work refers to the potential ability of
the diaspora to contribute to home country development i.e. skill level. Likewise, both Esman
and Kapur refer, in their second set of factors, to the context or home country characteristics that
influence the actual ability of diasporas to contribute. It is this factor and more specifically,
government policies, that are the concern of this study and hence the following section of the
literature review will be dedicated to the importance of this as a determinant of the level of
diaspora contributions as evidenced by different country experiences.

2.1.4 The Importance of Government Policy: Evidence from India & China
The important role of home country governments in shaping their diasporas’ engagement levels
is clear in the above mentioned literature. It becomes even more so clear when we examine the
experiences of countries deemed “successful” in mobilizing their diasporas for the purpose of
development. Perhaps the two most notable countries that have managed to benefit from their
diasporas are China and India. Because we are mainly concerned with human capital transfers,
we will only review literature concerned with this.
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Grossman, in trying to answer the question of why “some developing countries have successfully
leveraged the diaspora option, while others have failed to do so” refers to the case of China43. He
argues that China has effectively implemented strategies to deal with its brain drain problem.
Tracing China’s strategies beginning with the late 1970s (the opening up of China), Grossman
stresses the importance of the “Chinese government’s attitude towards overseas capital and
knowledge44.” Grossman argues that the Chinese government had recognized the relevance of
technology transfer to the continuing growth of China and hence worked to placate overseas
Chinese professionals. Although between 1978 and 1990 the Chinese government implemented
more than fifty laws and regulations targeting overseas Chinese to return, Grossman
demonstrates that the government soon after had a policy shift. While the Chinese government
was still worried about brain drain, it began to view emigration as a way to store brain power
overseas to be used in the future, as opposed to viewing it as a permanent loss. Grossman claims
that “this mindset has facilitated knowledge flows back to China and has contributed to its
economic development.45”

Xiang Biao, like Grossman, also explores the Chinese government’s policies towards the
diaspora. Biao stresses the shift of Chinese government policy (briefly mentioned above) as a
shift towards a transnational diaspora perspective. Biao explains “the Chinese government’s
emphasis on temporary return and transnational networks is probably most clearly evidenced by
the slogan, weiguo fuwu (serve the motherland), proposed in the late 1990s, as compared to the
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earlier notion of huiguo fuwu (return and serve the motherland), which indicates that physical
return is no longer regarded as a determinant.”46 This policy became known, by many such as
Clay Wescott, as the “dumbbell model” depicted below.
Figure 2.2: The China Dumbell Model

Source: Hongxing Cai, "Chinese Knowledge Diaspora in the Development of Chinese Research Universities,"
(presentation presented at the International Conference on Diaspora for Development) Washington D.C., July 13-14,
2009.

Hongxing Cai confirms the success of this Chinese government policy. He states that over 30
million Chinese diaspora members have played a role in China’s reform and opening up since
1978 and that the Chinese diaspora, particularly the knowledge diaspora, has been “actively and
deeply involved” in China’s development47. Cai also discusses the specific diaspora engagement
policies pursued by the Chinese government, however, these will be reviewed in the next section
of the literature review.

The Indian experience does in fact share some similarities with the Chinese experience as
Benjamin Chemouni argues in “The Diaspora as Economic Asset: How China and India Use
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Their Diaspora to Support their Economic Development.” Chemouni argues that the similarities
lie in the rationale behind the policies followed by India and China—explaining that both states
followed policies aimed at rendering their diaspora governable by producing a self-disciplined
diaspora that can act in accordance with the states’ interests.48

Marie-Carine Lall traces the emergence of Indian government policy towards the diaspora. She
explains that, before applying certain reforms in 1991, India had never really sought to exploit
the potential of its relatively large diaspora. Instead, before 1991, Lall argues that the Nehruvian
autarkic model of development that was coupled with a focus on nation-building diverted serious
attention from the diaspora.49 Nonetheless, gradually and especially after 1991, the Indian
government began to engage its diaspora for the purposes of supporting its development.

A case study published about the role of the Indian diaspora highlights the emergence of India’s
diaspora policy and explains that “recognizing the importance of overseas Indians in the wake of
liberalization and globalization, the Indian government took new initiatives to engage the
Diaspora.50” Chemouni also explains how India created a new institutional and legal framework
through which it courted the diaspora. A more detailed description of the actual policies followed
by India will be addressed in upcoming sections. What is clear, though, is that the Indian
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diaspora definitely assisted in the transformation of India into a knowledge-based economy and
played an especially strong role in the emergence of the Indian IT industry.51

2.1.5 Diaspora Engagement Policies of China
Literature on the cases of India and China, reviewed above, points to the important role of
government policy in benefiting from diasporas’ human capital. It will prove useful for the
purposes of this thesis to delve even deeper into the successful experiences of China and India
and review the literature concerned with the specific diaspora engagement and knowledge
transfer policies that they have implemented towards this end.

In the Case of China, the Chinese government’s recognition of the importance of overseas
Chinese talent and their general policy of “weiguo fuwu” (serve the motherland) has shaped the
formation of more specific policies aimed at both engaging the Chinese diaspora and of
transferring their knowledge, skills, and expertise. Biao has identified three different types of
Chinese government initiatives that compose their policy framework. They are namely policies,
concrete programs, and official websites52.

In terms of policies, Biao collected and analyzed 180 government policies issued during the
period from 1986 to 2003 relevant to the Chinese diaspora. The Ministry of Education, the
Ministry of Personnel, and the Ministry of Personal Security were found to be the main
formulators of these policies. Biao found that most of these policies were issued by the Ministry
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of Personnel and were aimed at liberalizing existing regulations and making working and living
environments friendlier to facilitate knowledge exchange. Biao also reviewed the policies issued
by the Ministry of Education and found that they are aimed at offering more benefits to the
diaspora. Biao observed that the remaining policies, formulated by the Ministry of Personal
Security, were meant to regulate exit and entry matters and issued for example a “green card”
which was meant to encourage and allow overseas Chinese professionals with foreign passports
to enter China freely within a period of time.53

Although according to Biao policies from the central government are impressive, he also points
to enthusiastic efforts of local governments particularly at the provincial and municipality
levels.54 Mu Xiaosen has spoken of the Liaoning province as an example of such local efforts;
Mu Xiaosen explained that they have invested RMB 78.5 million for projects that provide
overseas Chinese professionals with free offices and facilities, fund research, housing, and even
allocate for them special personnel to assist them in applying for national research funds. 55 Biao
explains that these types of incentives are not just restricted to rich provinces, he states that even
poor provinces such as Shanxi, and cities such as Xi’an, also provide Chinese diaspora
professionals with similar incentives.56 This illustrates the importance of initiatives at both
central and local government levels for a sound and effective policy framework. Universities
have been also found to play a role; one extremely interesting development was that of a
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university in Beijing that almost went as far as to guarantee spouses of diaspora professionals a
job with high pay and status57.

In an attempt to incorporate overseas Chinese professionals the Chinese government has also
attempted to acknowledge and publicize the achievements of overseas Chinese professionals
who have actually returned to China. They have recognized them through conferences that have
taken place multiple times throughout the past two decades such as the ones held in 1991, 1997,
and 200358. These conferences have been hosted by a variety of different government entities in
cooperation with one another. This no doubt points to the importance of coordination between
various government entities for effective diaspora engagement. Of course, though, these policies
of honoring returned Chinese professionals may be more symbolic than substantive in nature but
still work to incorporate overseas and returned Chinese professionals59.

In regards to concrete programs run by the Chinese government, Biao divides them into two
types of programs: funds-based and activity-based60. Examples of funds-based programs given
by Biao are programs meant to encourage short-term visits of overseas Chinese professionals,
programs to support collaborative research projects between China-based scholars and overseas
Chinese professionals, programs to support overseas Chinese professionals to start research
projects in China, and programs aimed at recruiting outstanding professionals to work in
strategic areas. A well-known program meant to encourage short-term visits of overseas Chinese
57
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professionals, for example, is known as the Sunlight Plan. The Sunlight Plan is a fund that
supports short-term visits for the purposes of academic exchange, training, participation in joint
PhD programs, the transfer of technology to underdeveloped regions in China, and participation
in research and development at state-owned large and medium enterprises61. The Sunlight Plan
also facilitates the setting-up of larger collaborative activities between overseas Chinese
professionals and China. Biao gives the example of when Chinese diaspora members based in
France visited the Gansu province in northwest China in July and August of 1997. These
diaspora members visited over seventy institutes and signed fifty-six proposals for joint projects.
The diaspora members also submitted two suggestions for agricultural technology and local
development62. No doubt such proposals and suggestions point to the links between the diaspora,
knowledge transfer, and China’s development. Another fund based program is the Distinguished
Young Scholars Program which has been set up by the National Science Foundation which
grants RMB 550,000–800,000 (US$ 66,000–96,000) to scientists below forty-five years of age
for a four year period. It is important to note that although this program is open to diaspora
members, returned diaspora members, and Chinese citizens who have never emigrated, 80
percent of grant recipients are either current diaspora members or returned diaspora members 63.
This suggests the importance of allocating a large budget to general nation-wide research
activities.
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Activity-based programs are various, but the most conventional activity of this type of program
is the invitation of Chinese professionals to visit China for the purposes of knowledge exchange
such as the “One Hundred PhD Holders Homeland Visit Delegations” event. Another activity
described by Biao is that of information exchange between specific knowledge-user institutes in
China and members of the Chinese diaspora such as the program run by the Ministry of Science
and Technology where local institutes all over China publicize their technology problems
through an e-newsletter titled “Snapshots of Science and Technology for Overseas Chinese” and
seek help from the diaspora64. Another example of an activity-based program is the Guangzhou
Overseas Students Fair which was started in 1998 and is held during the Christmas break to cater
to diaspora members working in the West and aims to introduce overseas students to the Chinese
market65. We found the timing of this fair to be particularly interesting because it points to the
Chinese government’s special attention to the characteristics and intricacies of its diaspora.
Moreover, it is important to mention here again that this fair is mostly a local initiative one again
pointing to the importance of local initiatives.

Finally, the last type of initiative aimed at engaging the diaspora and specifically benefiting from
their human capital is that of “official websites”. The Chinese government has set up websites
specifically catered to the diaspora. Biao explains how almost all government departments
related to the diaspora have set up either entire websites or sections of websites to target the
diaspora66. Grossman also speaks of how social networking and Web 2.0 have been used by the
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Chinese government to connect to its diaspora67. No doubt these have played a large role in
attracting highly skilled members of the diaspora and facilitating the transfer of their knowledge
to China as a survey conducted reveals that websites are by far the most important means of
information and communication for the Chinese diaspora.68

2.1.6 Diaspora Engagement Policies of India
India seems to have also recognized the value of its overseas’ talent and has actively formulated
and implemented policies to this end. Although India only really started actively engaging their
diaspora in the 1990s (as argued by Lall above), Eric Leclerc and Jean-Baptiste Meyer argue that
a few countries in Asia have attempted to mobilize their offshore human capital before anyone
else had thought about it. They argue that “India, for instance, had exercised the option of
occasionally calling on the non-resident Indian (NRI) experts to offset brain drain effects as early
as the 1960s and 1970s, although her efforts were not entirely successful.69”

More serious and successful efforts, however, really started in the late 1990s as Lall argues and
coincided with the liberalization of the Indian economy. According to Daniel Naujoks, “India
once had a closed economy that did not encourage foreign contributions, businesses, or
investment. When the government liberalized the economy in 1991, diasporic Indians became
more useful as agents of trade, investment, and technology.70” Hence, the government began to
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show significant interest in the diaspora and established a number of diaspora policies towards
this end. One of the first steps towards this was the initiation of the Persons of Indian Origin
Card Scheme. In 1999 the Indian government began this scheme which granted former Indian
citizens and their non-Indian-born descendants (up to four generations) near parity with actual
Indian citizens but did not permit them to vote, stand for election, or be employed by the
government. A similar sort of scheme, the Overseas Citizenship of India, was created six years
later and was aimed at those whose parents or grandparents once had or were eligible for Indian
citizenship on January 26, 195071. Similar to China’s policy of issuing a “green card” for
Chinese professionals with foreign passports, these two schemes were aimed at fostering feelings
of belonging to Indians abroad and at facilitating their entrance into India as well as quelling
demands for dual citizenship72.

Thomas Lacroix and Simona Vezzoli have explained how in 2004 a separate ministry was
created for the diaspora. Named the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, it had three different
categorical missions: 1) dealing with departure flows, 2) providing services and protection to
overseas Indians, and 3)

enhancing the development impact of the Indian diaspora73.

Although the Indian government had already set up an annual diaspora conference in 2003 (the
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas) that was meant to operate as a platform for interaction between
overseas Indians, the Indian government, and interested segments of the Indian society, such as

71

Ibid.

72

Simona Vezzoli and Thomas Lacroix, "Building Bonds for Migration and Development" (discussion paper
published by Migration and Development Sector Project) Eschborn, 2010, 19.
73

Ibid.

businessmen and cultural and charity organizations, this ministry set up many more of such
initiatives74.

Although there were many implemented initiatives, the two that are of most relevance to the
diaspora’s human capital contributions are known as The Global Indian Network of Knowledge
and The Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council. The first of these two is an electronic
network meant to facilitate knowledge transfers from abroad without requiring overseas experts
to relocate. The second was also created with the objective of benefiting from the diaspora’s
human capital and was basically created to serve as a high-level body to draw upon the talent of
overseas Indians.75

Similar to China’s diaspora policies, India’s diaspora policies include policies aimed at giving
rights to non-citizens, facilitating their entrance into India, and finally specifically benefiting
from the diaspora’s human capital through knowledge transfer programs, conferences, and thinktanks. While there is literature on other countries such as Taiwan, Ireland, Korea, the Philippines,
and Israel who have also actively courted their diasporas and succeeded in engaging them and
facilitating their knowledge transfers, the literature on China and India is evidence enough of the
importance of government policies in bringing about a high level of diaspora contributions to
homeland development.
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2.2 Conceptual Framework
To conclude this chapter we will now refer to the conceptual framework employed by this thesis.
This thesis uses Gramlen’s concept of “transnational governmentality” and his ensuing policy
typology to examine the Egyptian government’s emigration and diaspora related policy and
determine whether or not it is conducive towards diaspora engagement and specifically
knowledge transfer.

2.2.1 Transnational Governmentality
Gamlen’s concept of “transnational governmentality” is primarily based on Michael Foucault’s
notion of governmentality76. For Foucault this term refers to “the means by which a population is
rendered governable, through the construction, machination, and normalization of a set of
governmental apparatuses and knowledges.77” While Foucault’s term was indeed developed over
a period of years and is no doubt multi-faceted, it basically refers to the way in which a state
exercises control or governs its population. Gamlen, though, builds on this idea. He argues that
whereas a state is usually concerned with the governmentality of its domestic population, it is
possible for states to be also interested in the governmentality of their transnational emigrants or
their diasporas. By being interested in more than just the governmentality of its domestic
populations, Gamlen believes the state is thus transnationalizing governmentality78.
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Gamlen’s main focus is on diaspora engagement policies. He looks specifically at diaspora
engagement policies and sees them as part of a state’s process of transnationalization
governmentality. Gamlen’s understanding of diaspora engagement policies as part of a state’s
attempt to trasnationalize governmentality is actually quite similar to Peggy Levitt’s ideas on
diaspora engagement policies. Peggy Levitt also interprets states’ diaspora engagement policies
as an attempt by states to systematically redefine their boundaries to include members no longer
officially in their residence79. This redefinition of boundaries is believed to allow states to
reproduce what is known as citizen-sovereign relationships with members of their diasporas.

While citizen-sovereign relations usually refer to the exercise of power and authority over the
subjects of a state, governmentality includes more than just the typical rationalities and
institutions of sovereign power usually understood as belonging to citizen-sovereign relations.
Instead, Mitchell Dean explains that governmentality also regards subjects, and the forces and
capacities of living individuals, as members of a population that could be fostered, used, and
optimized80. Hence, it is understood that as states redefine their borders, transnationalize
governmentality, and reproduce citizen-sovereign relations with their diasporas they are actively
seeking the benefits that could be drawn from their diasporas whether financial (such as
remittances or investment) or nonfinancial (such as the transfer of human and social capital) in
nature. Formulating and implementing these diaspora engagement policies, then, ensures the
diaspora’s continued involvement in its homeland and a state’s benefit from this.

79

Peggy Levitt, “Transnational Migration: Taking Stock and Future Direction,” Global Networks 1, no. 3 (2001):
202.
80

Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, (Great Britain: Sage Publications), 1999,
20.

2.2.2 Diaspora Engagement Policy Typology
Gramlen’s framework of the transnationalization of governmentality also emerges as a result of
his systematic comparison of all the different types of policies being followed by seventy
different states. His work brings forth three different types of diaspora-engagement policies: a)
capacity building policies, b) extending rights to the diaspora, and c) extracting obligations form
the diaspora. Each of these three policies also has subtypes as can be seen in the figure below.
We will now devote some time to exploring what Gamlen means by each of his diaspora
engagement policy types.
Figure 2.3: Diaspora Engagement Policy Typology
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Source: Based on Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They, and What Kinds of States Use
Them?” (working paper published by COMPAS) Oxford, 2005.

As mentioned earlier, diaspora engagement policies are understood to be part of a state’s attempt
to recreate citizen-sovereign relations with its diaspora members. In order for such relations to be
produced, though, there must be a “cohesive, state-centric national society at the transnational

scale, with a corresponding set of institutions.81” The first of Gamlen’s policy types—capacity
building—includes two sub-policy types (symbolic nation building and institution building) and
work to this end.

The first policy subtype of symbolic nation building is aimed at strengthening the symbolic bases
of an imagined ‘diaspora’ community. State policies of this type attempt to produce a diaspora
that is homogenous and that feels allegiance to its home state. According to Gamlen, policies of
this type vary but seem to all be aimed at increasing emigrants’ sense of belonging to a
transnational community i.e. their nation’s diaspora. For example, states would promote the
culture of their state abroad amongst their diaspora members, would use inclusive symbols and
rhetoric, would shape its media and public relations in a way that targets the diaspora, and would
host conventions and conferences for the diaspora.

The second policy subtype of institution building aims to give the state systems and institutions
to govern it diaspora. So, while symbolic nation building policies aim to make the diaspora
governable, institution building policies aim to facilitate the governability of the diaspora by
furnishing it with institutions for this end. Policies of this subtype would include things like
monitoring (where institutions collect statistics about their emigrants for example), the creation
of consultative diaspora bodies, and the creation of dedicated diaspora offices and bureaucracies.

The second policy type also relates to a state’s objective of transnationalizing citizenship. Basing
his conception of rights on Marshall’s classic citizenship theory, Gamlen explains that states try
and extend civil, political, and social rights to members of their diaspora through what he labels
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as the extending rights policy type.82 Under this larger policy of extending rights, Gamlen once
again has two policy subtypes—political incorporation and civil and social rights.

The main goal behind a state’s use of political incorporation policies is the creation of incentives
for diaspora members to become involved in transnational activities that would benefit their
home states. Gamlen asserts that “the rationale behind politically incorporating emigrants is that
this upgraded membership status will flatter or appease expatriates, producing goodwill
relationships that help to protect steady flows of remittances and investments.83” Policies that
fall under this policy type vary but usually relate to issues of voting, nationality, or other special
membership concessions.

The second sub-policy type of civil and social rights is also related to a state’s attempt at the
extension of rights to its citizens abroad. Since guaranteeing citizens’ civil rights is an essential
element of legitimacy for any state, a state who embarks on diaspora policies of this type aims to
appear as its diaspora’s legitimate transnational sovereign. Policies that fall under this category
relate to a state’s recruitment, deployment, and protection of its overseas workers84. Likewise,
issues related to healthcare and welfare are also at times the subject of state’s diaspora
engagement policies.

82

Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement,” 10.

83

Ibid.

84

Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement,” 12.

In return for extending rights to their transnational citizens, states also attempt to extract
obligations from their diasporas. Gamlen purports that “the strength of states’ claims to
legitimately extract benefits from ‘their’ diasporas arguably flows from their reciprocal provision
of benefits.85” Of course it is important to note here that the use of the term obligations is not a
literal one. Most often there is no actual (legal or other) obligation that can be derived from the
diaspora by the state; it is not really an obligation. It is understood that diaspora members are not
obliged to do anything but may simply feel obliged in return for the many rights extended to
them for example. The obligations that states tend to extract from their diasporas relate to two
types of benefits—economic and political. In Gamlen’s typology, the policy subtype of
investment policies relates to economic benefits. The second policy subtype then relates to the
political benefits that can be amassed from its diaspora and is termed lobby promotion. Since this
thesis is concerned with the role of the diaspora in transferring knowledge for the purposes of
home country development we will only discuss Gamlen’s first policy subtype of investment
policies.

When speaking of investment policies, Gamlen is not only speaking of remittances, FDI
transfers, and the creation of special economic zones to attract expatriate investments, he is also
speaking of a wide variety of measures taken by the government to benefit from the diaspora in a
way that could assist in the state’s economic development. Of this wide variety of measures, we
are mainly concerned with what Gamlen refers to as knowledge transfer programs. Gamlen
explains that because new economic growth theory perceives knowledge as the engine of growth,
knowledge transfer programs are often seen as crucial aspects of state’s diaspora engagement
policies. He argues
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Countries with high emigration fear a ‘brain drain’ of the highly skilled, representing
both a loss on these investments and forfeiture of future gains through knowledge
production. The prospect of mobilizing highly skilled diasporas to increase knowledge
production at home is attractive to many states, especially those fearing brain drain86.
Gamlen then speaks of two types of knowledge transfer programs—the first one he explains is
the United Nations’ Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriates program (TOKTEN) and the
second is the virtual cluster approach87. UNDP’s TOKTEN program is mainly concerned with
facilitating temporary returns by researchers in diasporas for short-term consultancies or
fellowships in their respective home countries. The virtual cluster approach instead relies on an
infrastructure to facilitate communication and cooperation through the use of information and
communication technologies (ICTs). This virtual cluster approach depends on brain circulation
networks to develop viable ideas to benefit the home-country.88

Thus, Gamlen’s framework suggests that for governments to successfully engage their diasporas
and get to the level where they are able to benefit from their diasporas’ human capital, they must
at first attempt to build a transnational nation symbolically and build institutions to serve it, and
then extend rights to their diasporas in order that they may finally extract obligations from their
diasporas.

Figure 2.4: Diaspora Engagement Policy Sequence
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Source: Based on Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They, and What Kinds of States Use
Them?” (working paper published by COMPAS) Oxford, 2005.

This framework is applied to Egypt’s emigration and diaspora related policies in order to see
whether or not Egypt’s policies can actually be considered diaspora engagement policies that are
conducive to the Egyptian diaspora’s engagement. The policies found are assessed by Gamlen’s
three-type policy breakdown trying to see whether or not Egypt formulates and implements such
policies. It must be noted that although this paper is focused on the third policy type—that of
extracting obligations via knowledge transfer programs, this research investigates whether or not
and how Egypt is pursuing the first two policy types as well since as we have seen that the
success of the final policy type is dependent on successfully carrying out the first two policy
types. However, research on the third policy type is limited to investment policies and
particularly knowledge transfer programs since that is the focus of this thesis. The other country
experiences reviewed in the first part of this chapter as well as Gamlen’s policy typology will be
used as a ruler against which to measure the comprehensiveness and success of Egypt’s policies.

CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL CHAPTER ON EGYPTIAN EMIGRATION:
MIGRATION PATTERNS & POLICY THROUGH THE YEARS

3.1 Introduction
Currently Egypt is considered the largest labor-sending country in the region. Yet, this was not
always the case. Egyptian migration patterns have vacillated over the decades and can be viewed
as having undergone five distinct phases (as Ayman Zohry has identified): the phase prior to
1974, the phase of expansion from 1974-1984, the phase of contraction from 1984-1988, the
phase of deterioration from 1988-1992, and the current phase.89 It is important to trace the
patterns of Egyptian migration through these different phases while concentrating specifically on
Egyptian highly skilled emigration patterns in order to better understand how the Egyptian
diaspora can relate to Egypt’s development. This historical review will also focus on Egyptian
government policy and how it developed throughout the years setting the stage for our analysis
of current Egyptian government policy.

3.2 The Early Phase of Migration: Prior to 1974
As alluded to in this thesis’s introduction Egypt currently has a large diaspora; however this was
not always the case. Especially prior to the 1950s, emigration was not a central part of Egypt’s
history and very few Egyptians actually emigrated outside of Egypt 90. Some Egyptian students
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did travel abroad during the nineteenth century and some Egyptians did emigrate temporarily for
political reasons; however, such flows were very limited in nature. One of the most notable
quotes from a population study published on Egypt in 1936 that demonstrates the difference
between today’s migration patterns and earlier ones is “Egyptians have the reputation of
preferring their own soil. Few ever leave except to study or travel, and they always
return…Egyptians do not emigrate.”91 Indeed, the only real systematic form of emigration that
can be said to have taken place prior to the 1950s was that of Egyptian school teachers
emigrating to Iraq during the 1930s in the context of a program where Egypt was providing
teachers to other Middle Eastern countries92. It should be noted here that the first instance of
systematic emigration was highly skilled in nature. Nonetheless, such highly skilled emigration
was on a limited scale.

It was actually immigration, and not emigration, that was the overwhelming phenomenon during
the first half of the twenty-first century with immigrants from the Eastern and the Northeastern
Mediterranean countries coming into Egypt. The lack of substantial emigration flows and the
heavy presence of immigrants in Egypt led Egyptian government policy at the time to be mainly
concerned with immigration issues (such as the status of the non-Egyptian population) while
barely paying attention to emigration93. The emigration policies that were in effect till the mid1960s were largely composed of restrictions and limits on exists as well as difficult exit-visa
requirements such as the specification of a number of professions and 'productive groups' which
91
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were barred from emigration94. Such preventive emigration policies were in tune with President
Nasser’s generally restrictive policies at the time. Generally speaking though, migration policy
was not very developed at the time. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki states that before 1960, one would not
even find mention of “migration” among government officials or in the mass media.95

The mid-1950s were characterized with the beginnings of political, economic, and demographic
pressures such as the government’s burden of providing jobs to all university graduates. Such
pressures eventually culminated in the Egyptian government’s active promotion of emigration in
the 1960s. The first emigration promotion policy was only initiated in 1960s when the
government began encouraging young Egyptians to pursue further education abroad 96. The
Egyptian government began to reconsider its former policy of restrictions and prohibitions due to
the new political and economic circumstances Egypt was facing. The real policy shift took place,
then, in 1967. On October of 1967, a ministerial committee for manpower issued a major policy
statement emphasizing the importance of establishing a stable migration policy. It recommended
the encouragement of work abroad, the collection of information about foreign labor markets, a
survey of the manpower force in Egypt specifically the areas with a surplus and shortage of
labor, the establishment of contacts with countries in need of agricultural laborers, the
simplification of the bureaucracy related to emigration, and the preservation of contacts with
emigrants that could encourage them to visit Egypt and remit parts of their savings. 97 Here it is
extremely interesting to note that the latter part of these recommendations i.e. the
94

Ibid.

95

Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Shift in Egypt's Migration Policy: 1952-1978," Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 1
(1982): 53-68.
96
97

Ayman Zohry, “The Place of Egypt”.
Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “The Shift,” 55.

recommendation that Egypt maintain and preserve ties with its emigrants while encouraging
them to return back and remit savings can be said to be the first time an Egyptian governmental
body realized the value of its emigrants abroad and may compose the seeds of a diaspora
engagement policy.

These beginnings of a pro-emigration policy were at least in part effective in promoting the
emigration of young Egyptians as the total number of requests for emigration in 1969 totaled
approximately 28,000 as opposed to 15,000 requests for all previous six years combined 98. It
should also be noted that of those that travelled, especially after 1967, many PhD students that
had travelled abroad to study did not return to Egypt and settled down in their host countries.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian government’s promotion of emigration and work abroad was still
combined with policies that restrained emigration. The Ministries of Health and Industry, for
example, occasionally defended the necessity of imposing restrictions on the emigration of
medical doctors and engineers. Likewise quotas were assigned in multiple fields such as
medicine, dentistry, pharmacology, nursing, chiropractory, veterinary, engineering, architecture,
statistics, and high school teachers of language, geography and history. The fields that were
exempt from these constraints were interestingly agriculture, law, Islamic studies, fine and
applied arts, economics and political science99. These sorts of quotas while meant to protect
against the deterioration of Egypt’s essential human capital, were not very clever as they failed to
recognize the importance of specializations crucial to development such as agricultural experts
and economists. Such constraints still did keep emigration in check during this phase—limiting
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the number of highly skilled Egyptians that could have travelled abroad during this time;
nevertheless they were not too prohibitive as not all quotas were actually filled.100

It was only with the advent of Sadat’s rule that there was indeed a turning point in the Egyptian
government’s emigration policy. With Sadat’s liberalization or infitah came a liberalization of
emigration policy as well. Sadat’s 1971 Constitution established emigration (permanent and
temporary) as a right in Article 52. Various decrees and laws were issued since then to liberalize
emigration policy. A decree issued in 1971 (No. 73), for example, gave Egyptian emigrants the
right to be reinstated in their former governmental jobs within one year of their resignation in an
attempt to encourage them to travel abroad and still be able to return to their jobs if their
emigration was not smooth or successful101. An eighteen-point plan was also issued during the
year 1971 that removed various bureaucratic and administrative restrictions on emigration such
as those that dealt with issues of dual nationality, the lifting of exit visa requirements, the
renewal of passports, and the reduction in the quantity of paper work needed for emigration. A
year later, in 1972, the council of ministers further eased emigration procedures. Dessouki claims
that at this time the deployment of Egypt’s labor force became an “officially recognized policy
objective.”102

A note must be finally said about the nature of the policies of this phase. As he was speaking
about the government policies of this phase, Dessouki argues that
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In a manner truly reflective of Egypt's political system since 1952, migration policy has
developed in a piecemeal, pragmatic and eclectic fashion. It evolved through practice
guided by the ruling elite's cherished wisdom of 'trial and error'. It was molded in
response to changing events and circumstances. Thus, one notices the lack of a coherent
and concrete set of objectives based on an accurate estimate of manpower force and its
development103.
Clearly, emigration policies developed in this way could not have been very effective. Likewise,
it must be noted that at this time there were countless committees, departments and organizations
with conflicting jurisdictions and functions that also could not have been very effective in
managing emigration or in maximizing the advantages that could have emerged as a result of this
sort of emigration.

3.3. Egyptian Emigration during the Oil Boom: The Expansion Phase 1974-1984
The relaxation of emigration procedures at the dawn of Sadat’s coming to power set the stage for
a massive increase in the magnitude of emigration flows throughout the decade that followed.
Directly after the 1973 war began the second phase of Egypt’s emigration history. The
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973 and the
decision to raise oil prices by 70 per cent led to a tremendous increase in oil revenues and
allowed the oil-rich Arab states to embark on many ambitious development projects 104. These
development projects required much labor that was not available in the labor-poor Arab states.
Hence, the demand for Egyptian manpower rose as a result of the 1973 oil boom. While the
majority of emigration of this period consisted of low skilled labor migration, there were still
highly skilled Egyptian migrants emigrating at this time. The increasing demand for teachers, for
instance, spurred the emigration of skilled Egyptian teachers during this time. The Egyptian
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government also supported the emigration of highly skilled members of the health sector such as
doctors, veterinarians, pharmacists, and dentists who were also needed in the Gulf. The number
of Egyptian emigrants in 1970 when compared with the number of emigrants in 1976
demonstrates the immense increase in Egyptian emigration during this phase. As estimated by
CAPMAS, the number of emigrants in 1970 was about 70,000 as opposed to 1.4 million in
1976105.

As a result of the increased number of Egyptian emigrants outside of Egypt, Presidential Decree
No. 574 of 1981 was issued. This decree established the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs.
Leila Talani explains that “the role of this new ministry was to provide services to Egyptians
willing to migrate abroad. The ministry was also in charge of drafting an Egyptian migration
strategy aimed at favoring the economic development of Egypt106.” Reflected in this new
ministry’s role was once again the Egyptian government’s recognition of the potential usefulness
of emigration for Egypt’s development. However, as can be seen in Talani’s description of the
ministry’s role, this recognition seems to have only been about the “economic” or financial
advantages of emigration for Egypt.

Egypt’s first comprehensive migration law, Law 111, appeared two years later and is actually
still in effect today. It consists of five chapters and is titled “Emigration and Sponsoring
Egyptians Abroad.” The first chapter of this law establishes the right of Egyptians to emigrate,
their right to remain Egyptian nationals (i.e. have dual nationality), and their right to enjoy
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constitutional and legal rights. The first chapter also states the Ministry of Emigration Affairs
should do its best to strengthen emigrants’ ties with Egypt. The first chapter of the law also
established the Supreme Committee for Emigration which was to be headed by the Minister and
included high-ranking officials from other ministries. Amongst the things the committee was
responsible for was the setting up of training centers for potential emigrants and the provision of
cultural, media, and national materials to Egyptians abroad that could help them maintain ties
with their homeland. The second chapter of this law defines permanent migration, regulates it,
and allows even permanent migrants to remain nationals of Egypt. The definition of permanent
migrants (that is also adopted for this thesis) is: “the Egyptian who stays abroad permanently, by
obtaining the nationality of a foreign country, or a permanent residence permit to stay in this
country; or who stays abroad for at least ten years, or obtains an emigration permit from one of
the countries of emigration specified by a resolution of the Minister concerned with Emigration
Affairs.” The third chapter then defines and regulates temporary migration. The definition for
temporary migrant (also adopted in this thesis) is: “the Egyptian Citizen, who is not a student, or
seconded employee, who settles and sets up his main activity abroad, and has a job to make his
living, providing that he has stayed abroad for one year and has not taken the permanent
emigration procedures.” The fourth chapter details the numerous rights and advantages attributed
to Egyptian emigrants by the Egyptian government such as being exempt from taxes and the
right to return to your job in the public sector within two years of the date of emigration. Finally,
chapter five consists of concluding and transitional provisions.

3.4 Egyptian Emigration Following the Oil Bust: The Contraction Phase 1984-1988

While Egyptian emigration rates were soaring during the expansion phase discussed above, they
underwent a contraction during the mid-1980s. Oil prices had begun to decline in the early 1980s
and the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war in 1983 brought along with it an even further
decrease in oil prices as it aggravated tensions between members of OPEC107. Consequently, the
demand for foreign labor in the Gulf seriously dwindled. This contributed to a major decrease in
the demand for low skilled labor during this time—particularly for construction workers108.
Likewise, it is important to note that at this time the demand for Asian workers began to grow
vis-à-vis the demand for Arab workers; Asian workers were especially preferred for their
political docility109. Furthermore, the Gulf States embarked during this phase on a policy aimed
at replacing the foreign aspects of their labor force with nationals such as Saudi Arabia’s policy
of “Saudization”—still in effect today. It must be taken into consideration that accurate data
about this phase of Egyptian emigration is quite limited and hence it may be difficult to
completely deconstruct the dynamics of this phase. Nevertheless, estimates suggest that by 1985,
the number of Egyptian emigrants had diminished to about 1.4 million from 2 million in 1980110.

It is interesting to note, especially for our purposes, that although the demand for low skilled
labor declined at this time and low skilled emigration to the Gulf decreased, this was not exactly
the case with highly skilled Egyptian emigration. Zohry explains that highly skilled Egyptian
emigrants gradually began to replace low skilled Egyptian emigrants. This is of particular
interest to us as it points to the increasingly skilled nature of Egyptian emigration as well as the
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upsurge of rich human capital in Egypt’s diaspora111. Moreover, as Zahlan argues, it may make
more sense to discuss “a redistribution of labor” at this time, as opposed to a simple reduction in
the aggregate emigration rate112. Nonetheless a definite contraction of Egyptian emigration
cannot be denied—especially when one examines the phase that followed a couple years later.
3.5 The Deterioration Phase: Return Migration From 1988-1992
The contraction phase discussed above was soon after followed by a deterioration phase that
lasted from 1988-1992. This phase can be mainly defined by the phenomenon of return
migration that characterized Egyptian migration flows of the time. Egypt witnessed a major flow
of return migrants from the Gulf—of both highly skilled and low skilled migrants. It was the
1991 Gulf War that especially forced approximately 1 million Egyptian migrants (hosted by
Kuwait and Iraq) to return to Egypt113. Besides the phenomenon of return migration, Egyptian
migration flows at the time were also characterized by the decrease in the number of new
contracts issued to Egyptians. Zohry demonstrates the extent of this decline when he says that
Considering 1988 as a base year, the number of contracts halved in 1989. This big
decline was due to the decrease in the number of contracts with Jordan, Iraq, Yemen,
Saudi Arabia, and other Arab Gulf countries. In 1990, the number of contracts further
decreased to 43 per cent (of the base year 1988). In 1990, however, contracts with Saudi
Arabia and Libya increased.114
The effects of the Gulf War are definitely apparent in Zohry’s statement. Similarly the
International Labor Organization (ILO) explains that the number of Egyptians abroad declined
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from about 1.9 million in 1989 to about 1.5 million in 1991 which equates to approximately a
21.5 percent contraction115.

3.6 The Current Phase: Increasing Permanent, Irregular, and Highly Skilled
Emigration
Beginning in 1992 Egyptians began to emigrate frequently out of Egypt again and by the end of
1992 the number of Egyptians abroad consisted of about 2.2 million people116. This can be seen
as the start of the current phase of Egyptian emigration. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of
this phase is the increase in permanent Egyptian emigration. This permanent emigration took the
form of permanent emigration to more developed countries—particularly to Europe. The table
below contains data about both temporary and permanent emigration of Egyptians from the year
1982 to 1998. As can be seen, the number of permanent emigrants to developed countries grew
by an average of 83 per cent from the year 1990 to 1998. The number of permanent emigrants to
Europe specifically grew by 125 per cent. While temporary emigration also increased during this
time, it was a much smaller increase of 68 per cent117.

A note must be said here about the accuracy of this data and conflicts about it. As can be seen in
the table below, the Egyptian MME estimated that the number of Egyptians abroad was almost 5
million in 1998. The accuracy of MME figures is contested though because the MME is not
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aware of all those who emigrate—not all Egyptians who emigrate go through the MME.
CAPMAS conversely reported the number of Egyptians abroad was only 2.7 million in the year
2000. CAPMAS estimates particularly rely on results of conducted censuses; however, this has
repeatedly led to major underreporting as it appears that family members when asked about the
number of family members living abroad tend to underreport (most likely in fear of taxes being
levied on them or in fear of issues of military conscription)118. Hence, there are problems with
both sources of data. However, it should be noted that both sources correspond regarding the
proportion of temporary and permanent emigration (with two-thirds being temporary and onethird being permanent).

Table 3.1: Total Temporary and Permanent Migration119

Temporary
Migration
Arab
Countries
African
Countries
Asian
Countries
Total
Permanent
Migration
Australia
European
Countries
American
Countries
Total

1982

1983

1984

1990

1995

1998

2,946,120

3,206,169

3,157,139

2,083,262

2,129,050

3,511,859

600

2,411

75,358

952

-

2,545

-

284

635

601

-

6,073

2,946,720

3,208, 864 3,112,132

2,084,815

2,129,050

3,520,477

50,000
155,775

42,718
100,998

45,735
155,503

32,423
225,521

75,000
400,068

80,350
506,028

260,440

195,111

444,438

485,545

396,000

780,841

466,215

338,827

645,676

743,219

871,068

1,367,219
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Total
3,412,935
Temporary
and
Permanent
Migration

3,547,691

3,878,808

2,828,034

3,000,118

4,887,696

Source: Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Emigration Sector, as reported by CARIM, 2008, updated
7 February 2005.

It should also be noted that another qualifying characteristic of this phase is the increase in
irregular migration of Egyptians to Europe. It can be said that following the tightening of policies
by the European Community and particularly after the Schengen agreement in 1990 and the
Maastricht Treaty, Egypt faced an upsurge in the number of irregular emigrants.120 It is important
to keep in mind that although irregular migration is often associated with low skilled workers, in
the case of Egypt these irregular migrants are not only poorly-educated unemployed youth but
also in many situations fresh graduates121. An agreement signed between the Egyptian
government and the Italian government in 2006 is one of the ways that the Egyptian government
has tried to regulate migrant flows. Although the agreement has not been very successful due to
the fact that finding potential migrants in Egypt with the skills required by Italy has been
difficult, this agreement was still able to legalize the approximately 5000 irregular migrants in
Italy122. This high number of irregular migrants and an agreement aimed at mitigating the
problem definitely points to the magnitude of the phenomenon in recent decades.

This phase also witnessed a major increase in the amount of remittances received by Egypt—
especially in this last decade. In the year 2000, for example, remittances totaled approximately
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$2.85 million and continued to increase reaching $8.69 million in 2008123. As mentioned earlier
in this thesis, remittances in the year 2009 were only $7.1 million. This decline can be attributed
to the financial crisis that no doubt affected the amount of remittances remitted back to Egypt. It
is important to mention this overall gradual increase in remittances over the span of this decade
due to the importance of remittances for our topic of Egypt’s development. Although it is
generally agreed that the majority of remittances are spent on consumption, studies have shown
that remittances have also played a role in the formation of human capital in Egypt. A study
conducted by Asmaa Elbadawy and Rania Roushdy found that remittances have a mild positive
effect on the schooling of boys aged 15-17 and a strong positive effect on the school of
university-aged boys.124 Furthermore, the same study found that remittances had a positive effect
on the schooling of girls aged 6-11 but a mild effect on the schooling of university-level girls.125
Remittances have been responsible for not only increasing the level or years of schooling for
some children but have also been instrumental in putting or keeping girls in school. Because
many families in Egypt are less likely to send girls to school if they have a limited income,
remittances have played a part in increasing this limited income and allowing girls who would
have never been able to attend or continue their education to do so. We mention this effect
because it is no doubt relevant to human capital and Egypt’s development.

Now that we have looked at some of the developments of this phase, it is interesting to examine
characteristics of the current day diaspora. Currently, estimates of the number of Egyptians
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abroad range from 3 and 8 million126. It seems as though the figure that the majority agrees on
lies somewhere in between 6.5 and 7.5 million127. This is definitely a substantial number as it
composes about ten percent of the Egyptian population. It is also interesting to note the
distribution of emigrants amongst countries in both the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and the Arab world. The two graphs below illustrate the geographical
breakdown of Egyptians in OECD countries and in Arab countries according to the latest
comprehensive data available at CAPMAS.

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Egyptian Emigrants in Arab Countries by Country of Residence
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Egyptian Emigrants in OECD Countries by Country of
Residence (2000)
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While the distribution of Egyptian emigrants and the proportion of temporary to permanent
migration may initially give the impression of a low skilled Egyptian diaspora, such an
impression is misleading as in reality a large portion of the temporary emigrants housed in Arab
countries are actually quite skilled. Saudi Arabia currently houses the largest portion of highly
skilled Egyptians.128 Unlike the 1970s where most emigrants in the Gulf were low skilled
construction workers, there are currently many highly skilled emigrants (such as doctors,
engineers, business school graduates, and school teachers) currently employed in the Gulf. 129 In
2002, for example, 43.4 per cent of Egyptians in Arab countries were scientists, managerial, and
128
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technicians130. More up to date figures are unavailable yet it is likely that such a percentage is
even higher today as the share of low skilled workers in the Gulf is generally decreasing while
the share of highly skilled workers is increasing. This development points to an increasing rate of
Egyptian brain drain and points to the serious need for diaspora engagement policies that at least
try to make up for this brain drain by transferring knowledge from the Egyptian diaspora.

In regards to Egyptians living in OECD countries, the OECD’s online database does have data
about the level of education of immigrants residing in the OECD. In this case, there is a wide
variety with the lowest percentage of Egyptians possessing a tertiary education residing in Italy
(21 per cent) and with the highest percentages in Canada and the United States (65 per cent-62
per cent respectively) in the year 2008. The table below details the educational attainment of
Egyptians in the rest of the OECD countries. From this data, one can calculate that 47 per cent of
Egyptian immigrants in OECD countries possess at least tertiary education which is
approximately five times the level of Egyptians possessing tertiary education residing in Egypt—
only 9.59 per cent of Egyptians possessed tertiary education in 2008.131

Table 3.4: Percentage of Immigrants in OECD countries with Tertiary Education or
Advanced Research Programs
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Ayman Zohry and Priyanka Debnath, “A Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian
Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages.” IOM. 2010.

Country of Residence
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States of America

Percentage (%)
31.3
30.6
41.5
65.4
33.3
43.5
26.0
58.9
21.7
33.0
47.2
51.2
43.5
62.7

Source: The OECD Database in Ayman Zohry and Priyanka Debnath, “A Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian
Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages.” last modified 2010. IOM.
http://www.egypt.iom.int/Doc/A%20Study%20on%20the%20Dynamics%20of%20the%20Egyptian%20Diaspora%
20%28English%29.pdf , 28.

Egyptians in the diaspora not only have a higher educational profile than Egyptians in Egypt, but
they seem to have also gained many additional and useful skills upon travelling and working in
their host countries that they would not have gained had they remained within Egypt. Zohry and
Debnath found in a study conducted on the Egyptian diaspora that 44.3 per cent of Egyptians
living in Arab countries surveyed felt that their skill levels were enhanced as a result of staying
and working abroad. The study also found that of those surveyed in OECD countries, 97.5 per
cent of them felt that they had acquired new skills while working abroad.132 These findings
suggest that the Egyptian diaspora, more so in OECD countries but also in Arab countries is in
possession of many skills as a result of their emigration.
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Egyptians abroad are not only on the whole more educated and in possession of skills as a result
of studying or working abroad, but many of them are scientists, scholars and experts. Some
estimates have claimed that the overall number of such highly skilled Egyptians in the diaspora
is around one million. In an article titled “Egyptian Expatriates Help Egypt’s Emerging
Industries,” Noha Hatata argues that “approximately a million Egyptians residing outside of
Egypt are successful and accomplished scientists and experts in various fields 133.” The important
idea here is not necessarily the exact number of Egyptians abroad who are highly skilled, but the
popular perception that there are many Egyptians abroad that are successful and accomplished.
Ibrahim Badran, who was at one point president of the Academy of Scientific Research and
Technology (ASRT), explains that while on mission he had visited universities in seventeen
states in the United States and claims that he always found exceptional Egyptians at each of these
institutions. Galal Elgemeie, First Undersecretary of the State for Scientific Research at the
MOHESR, confirms this perception arguing that Egyptians abroad are very talented. He explains
that Egyptians in the diaspora are of “a very high caliber” and that they are able to succeed in
environments such as advanced countries in the OECD where there is a high rate of knowledge
creation and discovery. Egyptians are not only productive when in these environments but they
are also very good at innovation134.
Thus, it is extremely important to note that the above mentioned characteristics of Egyptians
abroad relate to Egyptian migrants abroad specifically. They do not take into consideration the
characteristics of the rest of the Egyptian diaspora such as the second-generation Egyptians born
to Egyptian migrants for example. Although no data on the rest of the Egyptian diaspora is
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available, we can definitely assume that the rest of the Egyptian diaspora is also quite skilled and
possesses much essential human capital that can be useful for Egypt’s development. No doubt
any effective diaspora engagement strategy should also take into account the rich resources
available in the entire diaspora and not just the migrants themselves. We will devote the next two
chapters to examining this.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed Egyptian migration patterns beginning with the early phases of
Egyptian migration and concluding with the state of Egyptian emigration today. We have traced
Egyptian emigration patterns finding that they have been especially affected by oil and
geopolitical circumstances in the region. We noted the expansion of Egyptian emigration during
the oil boom, the contraction of Egyptian emigration after the oil bust, and the return of Egyptian
emigrants to Egypt during the years of the Gulf War. We then examined the current gradual
increase in Egyptian highly skilled emigration to the Gulf and the increase in permanent
emigration—particularly to Europe. We also noted the existence of a highly skilled Egyptian
diaspora—both in OECD and Arab countries.

It has been also interesting to observe the policies of the different Egyptian regimes throughout
the different phases—starting with Nasser’s especially restrictive emigration policies, followed
by Sadat’s liberalization of Egyptian emigration policies, and ending with the introduction of
Egypt’s most comprehensive emigration law at the beginning of Mubarak’s rule (Law 111) in
1983 which continued with Sadat’s unrestrictive policy nature. Perhaps it is important to mention
here the absence of any real return migration policy. As we have seen, the Egyptian government

has been bent on encouraging emigration throughout the last couple of decades and has not
attempted to bring about the return of any of its emigrants. It is now necessary to delve further
into the current state of Egypt’s policies to see whether or not the government has implemented
policies that attempt to benefit from the diaspora without requiring its return. We will use
Gamlen’s policy typology, outlined in chapter 2, to examine Egyptian policies towards the
diaspora in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT’S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES:
CAPACITY BUILDING AND EXTENDING RIGHTS

4.1 Introduction
After reviewing in the last chapter Egyptian migration patterns and the Egyptian government’s
policy towards emigration (and specifically highly skilled emigration) through the years, this
chapter explores the Egyptian government’s policies towards the diaspora to see whether or not
they can be considered diaspora engagement policies according to Gamlen’s policy typology.
Since no studies exist to our knowledge that contain a comprehensive review of Egypt’s policies
towards the diaspora, research had to be conducted towards this end. Egypt’s diaspora policies
are explored below through Gamlen’s diaspora engagement policy typology. Gamlen’s threetype policy breakdown is used to navigate the complex field of Egyptian government policy.
This chapter deals with the first two policy types of Gamlen’s typology—capacity building and
extending rights policies. Although we are primarily interested in assessing whether Egypt’s
policies are conducive to knowledge transfer, we will still examine these policy types since
Gamlen has identified that the success of a government’s efforts at extracting such obligations
from the diaspora is bent on its successful pursuit of the first two policy types. The next chapter
will then be devoted to the main focus of this thesis which is the Egyptian government’s attempts
at extracting obligations, investment policies, and knowledge transfer programs.

4.2 Capacity-Building Policies: Symbolic Nation-Building &Institution Building

As explained in chapter 2, states pursue capacity building policies in order to be able to
communicate with their diasporas and therefore be able to build a nation symbolically (by
promoting their culture abroad for example) and build institutions (such as a specialized
ministerial level agency) to serve the diaspora. In this section we will first examine Egyptian
government initiatives that fall under the symbolic nation building policy type and then we will
examine the initiatives that fall under the institution building policy type.

In Gamlen’s policy typology, he refers to the use of inclusive rhetoric and symbols as a method
of symbolic nation building. He explains that home states, while attempting to engage with their
diasporas, often make symbolic gestures to reinclude the diaspora within their national
population. He states that “attempts at (re)inclusion are expressed in high-level rhetoric
celebrating emigrants as national heroes, and bestowing them with prizes and accolades 135.” Our
research revealed that it is in fact part of the Egyptian government’s policy to symbolically
reinclude the diaspora through this method. Although this specific intent was not documented in
Law 111 or any legal document, the government does frequently use high-level rhetoric when
targeting the diaspora. The government’s frequent use of the term “Sons of Egypt” to describe
Egyptians abroad no doubt is an example of this. Likewise, the government attempts to reinclude
the diaspora through the activities of the MOFA, the MOHESR, and sometimes the MME. The
MOFA’s consulates in diaspora-hosting countries, for instance, claim to work to make Egyptians
(both the migrants themselves and their families) feel included by celebrating and honoring
them. An example of this is when the Egyptian consulate in Sydney honored in March 2012
distinguished Egyptian students who got grades exceeding 99 per cent in the General Secondary
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School Certificate in Australia136. The Cultural Affairs and Missions Sector of the MOHESR,
though, seems to play an even stronger role than does the MOFA in specifically honoring highly
skilled Egyptians in the diaspora through the work of its cultural attachés abroad. Elgemeie,
while speaking of his experience as a cultural attaché in Berlin during the years of 2006-2009,
explained that he would commonly celebrate the achievements of Egyptian experts and scientists
abroad. He gave the example of the time he honored Egyptian engineer Hany Azir who built the
Berlin Hauptbahnhof in Germany137. The MME seems to also play a role in this through its
recognition of notable figures in the Egyptian diaspora—however; it seems to play a smaller role
than do the previously mentioned agencies.138 Such recognitions and celebrations do in fact seem
to be aimed at reincluding the diaspora in theory; however, in reality these activities no doubt
only incorporate a small segment of Egyptian diaspora and probably are not enough for the
building of a symbolic Egyptian transnational state. Hence, we will examine Egypt’s other
attempts at symbolic nation building below.

Other methods of symbolic nation building, as discussed by Gamlen, relate to the promotion of a
state’s culture and the induction of diaspora members into it. The Egyptian government has
indeed formulated a policy to this end as can be seen in Article 2 of Law 111 which dictates that
the ministry related to emigration is deemed responsible for
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Maintaining the Arab language and culture, the national heritage as well as the spiritual
ties among migrants, and disseminating them among their new generations through the
following:
• Enabling migrants’ children to pursue their education according to the Egyptian
educational systems.
• Establishing Arab cultural centers where migrant gatherings exist, and providing them
with libraries.
It should be noted that there is a divergence, however, between the formulation and
implementation of this policy. While in writing it seems as though the MME would be the main
body responsible for the implementation of such a policy, in reality it is the MOFA’s consulates
abroad that seem to be mainly in charge. Mohamed Minessy, Secretary General of the Egyptians
Abroad Welfare Fund, explained in an interview that the activities listed in Article 2 of Law 111
and noted above are the MOFA’s “indirect” forms of sponsoring Egyptians abroad. Such
activities are not new and have been going on for decades. Perhaps the most established of these
formulated policies in reality is that of enabling migrants’ children to pursue their education
according to the Egyptian system abroad. Minessy spoke of the proven importance of this for
Egyptians abroad. The policy of establishing Arab cultural centers and providing them with
libraries, though, does not seem to be actually implemented. At most, Egyptian consulates play a
role in the promotion of Egypt’s culture abroad through some dispersed activities. A recent
example of this was the celebration of the day of the Egyptian family which took part on March
3rd, 2012 at the Egyptian consulate in Jeddah. The MOFA claims that the main purpose behind it
was for Egyptians living in Saudi Arabia to “recall the atmosphere of family warmth and
harmony of Egypt”139. However, besides a couple of such activities that probably do not reach
the majority of Egyptians abroad, the Egyptian government does not have the reputation of being
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in very close contact with its citizens abroad. Badran expressed that Egypt needs to pay more
attention to these activities; giving the example of the Philippines, he argued that the success of
such activities is crucial to successful diaspora engagement.

Gamlen also specifically mentions that states often shape their media and public relations to
target expatriates as a means of symbolically building a nation. While this is no doubt still
relevant for states like Egypt, Gamlen’s understanding of “media” seems a bit outdated. Gamlen
only speaks of satellite television channels, newspapers, and websites with no mention of more
recent but perhaps even more effective forms of social media such as Facebook and Twitter
which have become essential components of any entity’s PR strategy. In Egypt’s case the focus
on media can be seen in Egypt’s policy documents. Also in Article 2 of Law 111, the Egyptian
government claims that
The state shall sponsor Egyptians abroad and do its best to strengthen their ties with
Egypt. The Minister concerned with Emigration Affairs shall take all necessary measures,
issues all resolutions necessary for achieving this purpose, and specifies the means of
ensuring this sponsorship, such as… Providing the mass media suitable for addressing the
issues of interest for Egyptians abroad, as well as providing them with reliable
information about their homeland.
This has in fact been implemented in reality—although once again the MME does not seem to be
the main agency responsible for taking “all necessary measures” to this end. Instead the Ministry
of State for Communications and Information Technology has played a larger role especially in
terms of traditional media sources.

Egypt was, for instance, the first Arab country to start satellite broadcasting when it launched the
Egyptian Satellite Channel in 1990. Nile TV International was also established a couple years
later in 1994 and is similar to the Egyptian Satellite Channel except that it broadcasts in English

and French also140. Egyptian governmental newspapers such as Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar
newspapers have also been printed in a way and continue to be printed in a way so as to reach the
cities that host large portions of the Egyptian diaspora abroad141. It should be noted here, though,
that there have been demands from the Egyptian diaspora for better targeted media. In 2007, for
example, the Vice President of the Egyptian Association in the United Kingdom called for the
establishment of a satellite channel specific to Egyptians abroad142. This signifies that perhaps
the implementation of Egypt’s formulated policy is not that effective and that currently
established forms of media do not fulfill the specific needs of the Egyptian diaspora.

More recently, the Egyptian government has exceeded Gamlen’s limited perception of media and
has attempted to use other forms of media to reach the Egyptian diaspora. In the last decade
Egyptian ministerial websites, particularly those of the MOFA (http://www.mfa.gov.eg) and the
Emigration Sector of the MME (http://www.emigration.gov.eg/) have been set up to cater to
Egyptian expatriates. Created with this audience in mind, the MOFA website not only provides
Egyptians abroad with information about Egyptian missions abroad but also offers services to
members of the Egyptian diaspora such as passport renewal. Likewise, the website of the
Emigration Sector is also burgeoning with information specific to Egyptian emigrants and also
offers certain online services. A website titled “The Sons of Egypt Abroad” hosted by the State
Information Services (http://www.sis.gov.eg/ VR/son/html/meclinindex.htm) was also created
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and seems to act as a portal for Egyptians abroad. Lately the Egyptian government has also
begun to infiltrate the ranks of social media. In an effort to keep abreast of the changing media
landscape especially after the Egyptian Revolution demonstrated the importance of social media,
the MOFA just launched an official webpage on Facebook and created an official account on
Twitter during the first couple months of the year 2012. On March 2nd, 2012 the Ministry stated
that “within the framework of Ministry’s keenness on achieving direct and rapid communication
with all Egyptian citizens - in Egypt and abroad - the Ministry created an account on Twitter.”
Minessy argues that these online forms of communication have revolutionized the way the
ministry communicates with Egyptians abroad and vice versa. Although it is too early to judge,
considering the creation of these accounts was just within the last month or two, it seems as
though social media will be one of the more important forms of media targeted at the diaspora by
the Egyptian government. Currently though, its effectiveness in absorbing the Egyptian diaspora
into a symbolic nation-state is unclear.

Conferences and conventions hosted by states seem to also play a role in many diaspora
engagement strategies. According to Gamlen,
In many cases, home-states have held large conferences and conventions with a range of
purposes in mind: to symbolize a willingness to listen inclusively to ‘constituents’; to
meet or appoint diaspora ‘representatives’ and establish patronage relationships with
them; to air state concerns and solicit feedback and help; and to broadcast messages at a
captive audience143.
In the case of Egypt, hosting conferences for the diaspora is definitely a part of its formulated
policy towards the diaspora as can be seen in the following excerpt of Law 111. The law states
that the ministry concerned with emigration should be responsible for “encouraging the
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conferences and seminars that address national issues [for the diaspora].” While the formulated
policy is definitely not clear enough in regards to why and how these conferences and seminars
are to be hosted, at least such intent is expressed in Law 111.

Moreover though, this policy does not seem to have been implemented as formulated. It seems as
though only a couple of conferences have been held towards this end by the Egyptian
government. There has been mainly one general conference for the diaspora that was originally
hosted by the Ministry of State for Emigration and then more recently was hosted by the MME.
The main stated aim of these general conferences for Egyptians abroad, according to the MME,
was the strengthening of ties between Egyptians living abroad and Egypt. Although they were
meant to take place on a regular basis, the conferences were first initiated in 1984 but were only
held on a sporadic basis afterwards. The conferences were initiated again after Aisha Abdel
Hady became minister in 2006. The latest of these conferences was hosted in July of 2009 under
the title “Interaction, Welfare, Development.” Although it was meant to discuss a wide variety of
topics of relevance to the diaspora, it seems as though there was a major focus on facilitating the
investments of the Egyptian diaspora. The first session of the three day conference, for example,
was headed by the Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieldeen and targeted the development
process in Egypt, investment environment and conditions, and the role of the ministry in
encouraging and facilitating the procedures for investments144. Wael Farrag, a senior official
working in the MME and a member of the Egyptian Society for Migration, explains that besides
the fact that they have been hosted in a sporadic manner, one of the main reasons these
conferences have not been effective in incorporating the diaspora is that they have been focused
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on extracting investment from the diaspora. He says that Egyptians feel like the government is
constantly trying to “suck them dry” and hence they cannot see these conferences as more than a
plot for extracting more money from them. It is therefore difficult to consider these conferences
as a successful attempt by the government to symbolically build a transnational nation.

There have been other such conferences that have been hosted in a similarly erratic manner
aimed at engaging with the diaspora but they have also been often discontinued after only a
couple meetings—if even. Most recently, for example, a conference titled “1st Conference of
Young Egyptians Abroad” hosted by the MME in collaboration with the National Youth Council
and the Ministries of Investment, Civil Aviation, Tourism, Defense, Culture, Information,
Education, Higher Education and Housing was hosted in 2010. However, it seems as though the
year 2010 was the first and last time such a conference was hosted. It is doubtful that a
conference hosted only one time could be very effective in encompassing the Egyptian diaspora.
Nevertheless, this particular conference is of interest because it encompasses more than just
migrants themselves but also aims at including a greater portion of the Egyptian diaspora—its
youth.

Apparently, although hosting conferences and conventions may be an element of the Egyptian
government’s formulated diaspora engagement polices it is not one that is implemented as
formulated. Minessy confirms this saying that although there have been gatherings of this sort
that they have been mostly unsuccessful145. Mohieldin Hamed Tantawy, Undersecretary of the
Central Department of Foreign Relations at the MME also says such conferences have been
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ineffective; saying that although there have been many, nothing substantial has come out of these
conferences. It is important to note that other conferences for the diaspora have been hosted in
Egypt; however, they have been actually initiated by associations of the Egyptian diaspora or
other nongovernmental associations in Egypt with a focus on knowledge transfer and hence will
be discussed later in chapter 5.

It is understood that as governments are symbolically creating a nation state that includes their
diasporas, they are also building institutions that can cater to their diasporas and help govern
them. Gamlen speaks of the formation of consultative bodies and transnational networks
composed of diaspora members as examples of these institutions. He clarifies that these sorts of
institutions are often created to help states include members of their diaspora by providing them
with useful means for channeling diaspora voices. It seems as though such institutions are mostly
absent in the case of Egypt. The only real body created for the diaspora is the General Union for
Egyptians Abroad which was created in 1985. Its board of members is composed of fifteen
people (three returned Egyptian emigrants and twelve Egyptians still in the diaspora).146. This
union was created as a result of a recommendation originating from one of the general
conferences hosted for the diaspora. It seems as though the government at the time happily
created this union since this union was to be overseen by the Egyptian government—in contrast
to the different diaspora associations that had emerged in various diaspora-hosting countries147.
This union, however, has been far from efficient, suffers from problems within its board of
trustees, and its members have often complained of much interference from the MME especially
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since the union is funded by the MME148. Thus, it is unlikely that this union is able to properly
serve its purpose of being a “consultative body.”

Of the other more traditional types of institutions discussed by Gamlen such as ministerial level
agencies and monitoring agencies, some do indeed exist in Egypt. As has been pointed out in the
historical chapter of this thesis, a ministry was founded to deal specifically with the emigration
of Egyptians. Due to the increased number of Egyptian emigrants outside of Egypt and
specifically in the Gulf, a presidential decree established the Ministry of State for Emigration
Affairs in 1981149. This ministry was later combined with the Ministry of Manpower and
Training in 1996 leading to the creation of the current day MME 150. The MME is in the theory
the main body responsible for migration matters of which is dealing with the diaspora. Within
the MME is the Emigration and Egyptians Abroad Sector which also handles diaspora-related
matters.

Perhaps the objectives of the Emigration and Egyptians Abroad Sector are a good indication of
the way in which the Egyptian government views the function of this institution. According to
the website of the Emigration Sector, “The role of the Emigration Sector is to develop a
comprehensive Egyptian Emigration Strategy, to provide the necessary care for Egyptians abroad
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and to benefit from their scientific potential in order to contribute to the process of development
in Egypt151.” The following are the objectives also listed on their website:
First: to develop executive plans and policies to encourage Egyptian emigration and
provide the opportunities that ensure its success, on the basis of the assumption that
migration is a natural and stable phenomenon.
Second: to sponsor Egyptians abroad, encourage them to create Egyptian gatherings,
unions and clubs and focus on the second and third generation of migrants by fostering
their ties and allegiance to their homeland.
Third: to achieve the maximum capitalization of Egyptian potential abroad, whether in
relation to scientific and research knowledge transfer or to the contribution in savings to
Egyptian development strategies; to support Egyptian capacities inside and outside
Egypt.
Fourth: to establish an integrated database on Egyptians abroad, emigration markets, and
migration; to regulate legislations in the countries of destination.
A look at these objectives clarifies how the creation of the Egyptian Emigration Sector can be
interpreted as being part of Egypt’s diaspora engagement policies. It is objectives two and three
of this government sector that particularly signify that the Egyptian government is aware of the
importance of communicating and strengthening ties with its diaspora. Moreover, objective three
specifically relates to the main focus of this thesis—the Egyptian diaspora’s human capital
contributions referred to here as “scientific and research knowledge152.” Nonetheless, it is vital
for us to keep in mind that just because an entity’s objectives acknowledges the significance of
these aspects does not mean that they are necessarily realized in practice. Therefore, chapter 5
will be devoted to exploring this in detail.

The other main institution that can be said to have been created for the purposes of diasporarelated matters is the Consulate Section of the MOFA. The Consular Affairs section of the
MOFA is mainly responsible for providing services to Egyptians abroad. As of late, a specific
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institution within the MOFA titled the “Egyptians Abroad Welfare Fund” was created in 2011 to
provide better quality services and care for Egyptians abroad. In the project’s document the
importance of the diaspora is recognized; it states that Egypt’s real wealth is not in its land, Nile,
or cultural heritage, but in its expatriates who fill the world with their expertise and contributions
in all the different fields of culture, knowledge, and life. It is anticipated that this newly created
body will help Egypt extend more rights and services to its diaspora. Besides the bodies in the
MME and the MOFA, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) also has the Bureau of Travel, Immigration
and Nationality, the Civil Services Sector, the Personal Affairs Sector, and the Labor Sector that
all deal with migration and diaspora-related issues153. Of course this is not to say that other
governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Education (MOE), the MOHESR, the Ministry of
Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MOCIT) do not
deal with the diaspora, but simply that the previously mentioned institutions are at the core of
government-diaspora interactions.

It is important to consider though that the number of institutions that deal with the diaspora is not
necessarily a point of strength. Tantawy explained in an interview that there needs to be greater
coordination and unity in dealing with diaspora matters and that the proliferation of all these
bodies does not signify the success of Egypt’s diaspora engagement strategy. Mohamed Shawky,
former legal consultant to the MME, attributed this messy situation to the fact that Egypt’s Law
111 does not accurately specify the role of each of these institutions since at the time of the law’s
adoption all these bodies did not exist. The lack of coordination in diaspora engagement policy
making can also be attributed to the often competitive nature of the two main ministries that deal
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with the diaspora—the MOFA and the MME. Tension between these two institutions seems to
exist and became apparent to us through interviews conducted with policymakers in both of these
ministries. Apparently such tension is not rare as Gamlen claims that
As institutions dedicated to expatriate affairs grow within the state system, a tension
sometimes emerges between the powerful agency containing the immigration
bureaucracy (often the labor or justice department) and the foreign service. The former
tends to claim a traditional stake in anything related to migration policy, while the latter
inevitably forms the front line of home-state contact with expatriates.
In the case of Egypt, when asked about the activities of the MOFA and if they encroach on the
domain of the MME, a senior official in the MME expressed that they in fact do. He attributed
this fact to the elevated status of the MOFA vis-à-vis other ministries. He argued that the MOFA
is the ministry of the “pashas” while the MME is the “black duck” of ministries. He also
complained of limited funding in comparison with the MOFA. Furthermore, he stressed the need
for greater capacity building of the MME. When policymakers in the MOFA were asked about
their encroachment on MME territory, they took on a defensive note arguing that there is plenty
of work to be done and that they have no problems sharing this workload with the MME. This
situation seems to be improving, however, as Minessy explained that following the revolution
coordination between the two entities has become more fruitful.

It is also extremely important to note here the absence of a ministerial level agency specifically
for emigration and the diaspora. As was noted in the literature review and conceptual framework,
numerous countries interested in the governmentality of their diasporas have created ministerial
level agencies for them. We have seen this, for example, in the case of India where the Ministry
for Overseas Indians was created to manage emigration and interact with the diaspora. This,
however, is not currently the case with Egypt with the Emigration Sector being only a body

within a larger ministry that deals with all issues of labor and manpower (the MME).
Furthermore, the MME is currently suffering from a severe lack of capacity. Farrag argues that
this is one of the greatest obstacles to successful diaspora engagement. He explains that he has
campaigned for the creation of such a ministry many times by discussing the idea with various
senior officials including most recently the former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. Farrag
explains, though, that although they were promised the creation of such a ministry, they are yet
to see any progress in regards to its creation.

A remark can be also be made here in regards to the monitoring institutions that Gamlen refers to
in his policy typology. For Gamlen, monitoring refers to the surveillance of the diaspora. Gamlen
explains “This process is often not merely a way of collecting inert data, but a way of selecting
actors whom it would be profitable to deal with and forming long-term relationships with these
actors154.” In the case of Egypt, Egypt’s emigration law does in fact refer to a policy that works
towards the preparation of “an overall routine survey of the numbers and categories of Egyptians
abroad, in collaboration with other entities.” In reality Egypt does have multiple institutions that
collaborate to collect statistics about emigration and the diaspora in specific. The emigration
sector, for instance, participates in this collection of data as evident in objective four where it
aims “to establish an integrated database on Egyptians abroad.” The MOFA also plays a part in
this collection of statistics on diaspora members mostly through consulates abroad. It is quite
interesting to find that the third ministry under study the MOHESR also participates in a similar
way. A report published on Egyptian higher education policy explains that “Egyptians wishing to
study abroad also have to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
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Research and to re-register on return. The Ministry holds and publishes data on such students155.”
Of the other ministries briefly mentioned above the MOI also plays a role in the collection of
statistics on the diaspora. The comprehensiveness of such monitoring, however, has proven itself
quite subpar which is evidenced at the very least by the fact that estimates of Egypt’s diaspora
vary by the millions. Furthermore, the Egyptian government does not go beyond this mere
collection of statistics i.e. it does not reach really out to actors and associations of the diaspora
and establish long-term relationships. Farrag also confirmed that this policy of monitoring has
not been implemented in the best way possible. Such a state is very unfortunate as having such
information and monitoring the activities of the diaspora is no doubt vital for the success of any
diaspora engagement strategy. We will now move on to the next diaspora engagement policy
type to see if and how the Egyptian government extends rights to members of its diaspora.

4.3 Extending Rights: Political Incorporation & Civil and Social Rights
After discussing the basic symbolic nation building and institution building policies of the
Egyptian government, we can now proceed to discuss the policies of the Egyptian government
that seek to extend rights to the diaspora. As stated before, Gamlen divides policies related to
extending rights into two subcategories—political incorporation and civil and social rights. We
will first consider Egyptian government policies that relate to the political incorporation of the
Egyptian diaspora.

Gamlen argues that states’ rationale behind politically incorporating emigrants is that this
upgraded membership status will flatter or appease expatriates and help produce goodwill
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relationships that protect states’ steady flows of remittances and investments156. There are many
methods of political incorporation that can take place and vary from simply offering diaspora
members special membership concessions, allowing them to vote, and even offering them
parliamentary representation. In this sense, Egyptian government policies seem to be somewhat
concessional—but only following the Egyptian revolution. It is true that ever since the
Presidential Decree issued in 1971 Egyptians have had the right to dual nationality. Such a right
was also confirmed in Law 111; Egyptians are granted the right to dual nationality as can be seen
in article 1 of the law:
Egyptians, whether individuals or groups, shall have the right to permanent or
temporary migration, whether the purpose of migration necessitates permanent or
temporary stay abroad, in accordance with the provisions of this law and other laws in
force. Egyptians shall keep their Egyptian nationality according to the Egyptian
nationality law. Their permanent or temporary migration shall not result in violating the
constitutional or legal rights they enjoy in their capacity as Egyptian citizens, as long as
they do continuously keep their Egyptian nationality.
The fact that Egypt has conferred dual nationality to its citizens is not something to be taken for
granted as not all states pursuing diaspora engagement policies grant their citizens this right.

Besides granting members of the diaspora the right to dual nationality though, Egypt did not do
much to politically incorporate its citizens until after the revolution in January 2011. Even
though technically Egyptians abroad had the same rights afforded to Egyptians in Egypt, such as
the right to vote, these rights were not realized in reality. Egyptian groups abroad had been quite
dissatisfied with the actualization of their rights and had been lobbying for years for more
political rights and specifically the ability to vote157. Their lobby process was not completely
ineffective as there was a response to their calls even before the Egyptian revolution. Around the
156
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year 2005, for example, there were attempts by members of the Egyptian government (within the
MME) to amend Egyptian Emigration Law 111 to clarify the political rights granted to Egyptians
in the diaspora and to specifically grant them the right to vote in reality. Nonetheless, as with
many of such initiatives, Shawky explains that the process of amendment was stalled especially
after the change of leadership and the appointment of Aisha Abdel Hady as the Minister of the
MME in 2006158.

Renewed calls for greater political rights during the events of January and February of 2011,
however, were difficult for Egyptian officials to ignore. The interest of the Egyptian diaspora in
Egypt’s affairs was most definitely demonstrated during these events, and its close ties with
Egypt were proven when members of the Egyptian diaspora abroad not only closely monitored
the uprising but even staged their own protests worldwide. When former President Mubarak
stepped down, Egyptians abroad held celebrations everywhere—from in front of the Egyptian
Embassy in Bahrain to Trafalgar Square in London. It is not surprising then, that after such
strong participation of the Egyptian diaspora in Egypt’s revolution that steps would be taken to
allow the diaspora to participate democratically in its country’s affairs. Minessy admitted that the
new revolutionary ideas of January 25 definitely paved the way for further involvement of
Egyptians abroad by making it possible for them to vote using their national ID cards (Law
130—2011). He explained that they [the MOFA] “want Egyptians abroad to be part of Egypt159.”
Roshdi, a spokesman from the ministry, also asserted that recent changes such as allowing
Egyptians abroad to authorize presidential candidates would “enable Egyptian expatriate to
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participate effectively in the political process in their motherland 160.” Minessy admitted that
although Egyptians are able to vote using their national ID card, Egypt could still expand
political rights to the diaspora further by allowing voting using the number on their birth
certificates. This would allow those who do not have a national ID card to still be able to vote.

It was also interesting to hear Minessy speak of how the Egyptian government would like to
eventually offer Egyptians abroad parliamentary representation—without even being directly
asked about it. He explained that this representation does not have to be from the expats
themselves but can even be elected officials residing in Egypt. Such thinking is no doubt in line
with the greater political liberalization that is supposedly sweeping the policy scenes of Egypt
following the revolution. Nonetheless, such a step does not seem to be on the recent horizon as
Minessy only “hopes” that this will soon materialize and no concrete steps have been taken
towards this end. Likewise, such a move seems unlikely due to the hesitant manner in which the
Egyptian government has been extending political rights to the diaspora—even after the
Egyptian revolution. In the eligibility requirements for the Egyptian president, defined in the
Egyptian constitutional amendments that followed the revolution, Egyptians with dual
nationality or Egyptians married to non-Egyptians were disqualified from running in presidential
elections161. Such a decision was viewed as being hostile towards the Egyptian diaspora and
especially towards certain renowned figures in the diaspora such as Ahmed Zewail. Such a move
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conflicts with the recent move towards the facilitation of voting for Egyptians abroad and hints at
the incomplete extension of rights to the diaspora. Nevertheless, the most recent step of allowing
Egyptians abroad to vote seems to be a positive step forward in terms of achieving the political
incorporation of the diaspora. Although it is still too early to accurately judge the effectiveness of
such a policy, we imagine this to be a very important move in strengthening ties with the
Egyptian diaspora which could work to improve Egypt’s ability to extract obligations from the
diaspora.

Besides extending some political rights to the diaspora, the Egyptian government does also try
and extend civil and social rights. The importance of securing these rights for the diaspora are
expressed in Article 1 of Law 111 where it is stated that “permanent or temporary migration shall
not result in violating the constitutional or legal rights they [Egyptian migrants] enjoy in their
capacity as Egyptian citizens, as long as they do continuously keep their Egyptian nationality.” It
should be noted though that this article suffers from lack of detail and hence even Egypt’s
formulated policy does not seem effective in extending the necessary rights to Egyptians abroad.
In practice the Egyptian government does extend certain rights to the diaspora. For example, the
Egyptian government at times negotiates on behalf of Egyptian migrants (as in the example
where it attended a meeting of Fishermen in Greece162) and occasionally also checks on the
welfare of Egyptians abroad (as in the example where the consular commission from the
Embassy in Manama, Bahrain visited Egyptian expatriates imprisoned in the Manama prison to
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check on their conditions)163. Egyptian consulates and embassies abroad also seek to help any
Egyptians who have encountered legal problems in their host country164. These activities are of
course quite typical of countries’ diplomatic missions abroad but still are important for diaspora
engagement. It should be noted that this type of extension of rights, however, in practice is rarely
relevant to highly skilled members of the diaspora.

Also, as with the implementation of a lot of these policies—it is doubtful that such an extension
of civil and social rights is very effective. Minessy expressed that the provision of these rights
and services is a “huge load” for the MOFA giving the example that at the very minimum even if
only 1% of the Egyptian diaspora was in need of legal help, for example, that would account to
approximately 70,000 cases for consulates abroad to deal with165. It should be noted that few
Egyptians abroad seem to have ever been satisfied with the services extended by consulates
abroad. A study conducted on the Egyptian diaspora found that Egyptians abroad still feel that
there is significant room for improvement in the services provided Egyptian embassies and
consulates abroad. Of those Egyptians surveyed, most expected a certain level of ignorance and
negligence on the part of the staff in these embassies even if they had not actually visited an
Egyptian governmental agency abroad166. Farrag confirmed in an interview the findings of this
study claiming that Egyptians abroad “would rather get imprisoned than have to deal with an
Egyptian consulate or embassy abroad”. Consequently, in reality very few members of the
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diaspora seem to benefit from this extension of rights; perhaps it is only low skilled workers who
have no choice but to depend on the Egyptian government for protection of these rights when
abroad. This no doubt signifies that the implementation of this specific diaspora engagement
policy is likely to be highly ineffective in reaching out to the diaspora and extending to them the
rights they need to acknowledge the Egyptian government as its legitimate sovereign while
abroad.

4.4 Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, the Egyptian government has in fact formulated policies that
target the Egyptian diaspora in order to engage it in a symbolic nation state. As can be seen in
both Law 111 and documents of the relevant ministries, these formulated policies aim to reach
out to diaspora members and include them by using inclusive rhetoric and symbols, shaping
national media, spreading the nation’s culture, and hosting conferences. Unfortunately though,
we found that in practice these policies were not implemented as formulated. In particular we
found that conferences have been hosted in a sporadic manner and have concentrated on the
advertisement of investment opportunities to diaspora members as opposed to functioning as a
positive arena for the strengthening of state-diaspora relations. It must also be noted that these
policies have been mostly aimed at migrants themselves, with few policies actually
encompassing other members of the diaspora.

We have also noted that multiple institutions have been built by the Egyptian government to aid
it in the governmentality of its diaspora such as the emigration and consulate sections in the
MME and MOFA respectively as well as many other bodies in different ministries. At the same

time though, we lamented the absence of a ministerial level agency specific to the diaspora. The
redundancy of these bodies and their functions, tension between them, and concurrently the
absence of a central diaspora body is clearly an obstacle to efficient diaspora engagement.
Because Law 111 has not properly identified the institutions that should handle diaspora matters
and has not specified the specialized functions of each, it seems as though a coordinated and
comprehensive diaspora policy framework is impossible. We also found that although Egypt did
form a consultative body from the diaspora (the General Union for Egyptians Abroad), this union
suffers from many problems such as interference from the Egyptian government and is currently
quite ineffective. Finally, we also spoke of the existence of monitoring institutions in Egypt but
lamented their inability to provide us with any accurate or reliable data about the Egyptian
diaspora—once again clearly hindering the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive
and effect diaspora engagement strategy.

We have also reviewed Egypt’s policies towards the political, social, and civil rights of Egyptian
citizens abroad. We highlighted the recent shift following the Egyptian revolution when the
government went to greater lengths to politically incorporate its diaspora through the
establishment of absentee voting using national ID cards. Yet we pointed out further expansion
of absentee voting to allow voting using ID numbers on birth certificates as an important move
that should be considered by the Egyptian government for more effective diaspora engagement.
Furthermore, we noted parliamentary representation for the diaspora to be a much needed
initiative. We also found that while Egypt’s extension of social and civil rights is briefly
mentioned in Law 111, it is not clearly formulated. Likewise, we found that even if certain rights
are provided to the Egyptian diaspora in reality, they are most often only relevant for low skilled
emigrants. Egyptians abroad, especially those who can afford to, shy away from dealing with

Egyptian embassies and consulates abroad due to their perceived (and most likely actual
inefficiency) making the implementation of the latter part of this policy highly ineffective.

Overall it seems as though the institutions Egypt has built for the diaspora have not been
completely successful in symbolically building a nation state and in extending political, social,
and civil rights to its diaspora. Although many of these policies have been included in Egypt’s
Law 111 and in various ministries’ policy documents, they have not been clearly formulated as
evidenced by the lack of details in these documents. No doubt the incoherent and
incomprehensive nature of Egypt’s formulated policies has consequently contributed to the its
often unsuccessful attempts at diaspora engagement. This, coupled with weaknesses in
implementation, has definitely negatively affected Egypt’s ability to engage with its diaspora.
This is not say that there are no strengths to Egypt’s interactions with its diaspora, but that one
would not expect Egypt to be able to easily extract obligations from its diaspora based on the
state of its first two policy types of capacity building and extending rights. Nevertheless, we
should still see whether or not Egypt does pursue extracting obligations policies and specifically
knowledge transfer policies since it is still possible for states to pursue such policies without
perfecting the implementation of the first two policy types.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT’S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES:
EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS & KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

5.1 Introduction
It is understood that the main rationale behind the formulation and implementation of the two
previously discussed policy types for most states relates to their recognition of the many benefits
that could be derived from their diasporas. The process of extracting these benefits is what
Gamlen has termed the “extracting obligations” policy type. As explained in chapter 2,
extracting obligations can take many forms of which are investment policies (that relate to FDI,
remittances, and knowledge transfer) and lobby promotion (which relates to the use of diaspora
members as political lobbyists in their countries of residence). Our interest in this thesis is not
related to the way the diaspora can act to improve the political circumstances of Egypt on a
global scale, but how the Egyptian diaspora can participate in the socio-economic development
of Egypt. Therefore, this thesis will only review the investment policies type while concentrating
on knowledge transfer policies and programs in order to be able to assess whether or not Egypt’s
policies are in fact conducive to knowledge transfer from the diaspora.

Our initial survey conducted on the Egyptian government’s investment policies brought forth
more information on both remittances and investment than it did on knowledge transfer. We
found that Egyptian government policy since 1967 (see section 3.2) has recognized the
importance of remittances and has pursued numerous policies that seek to encourage emigrants
to remit—the earliest of which was for example aimed at allowing emigrants to open foreign

currency accounts in Egyptian banks and offering them high interest rates167. Moreover, this
research found that the benefits that could be gained as a result of Egyptian diaspora members
investing in Egypt seem to have also been recognized by the Egyptian government early on. This
can be seen as early as 1977 when Law 32 allowed tax exemptions to Egyptians similar to the
ones granted to foreigners in an attempt to encourage Egyptians abroad to invest in Egypt. More
recently also in Article 3 of Law 111 the ministry concerned with emigration has been given the
responsibility of “considering and suggesting the means that enable Egyptian migrants abroad to
contribute with their savings in productive development projects in Egypt.” How successful the
government has been in implementing these policies, however, is contested and beyond the
scope of this thesis.

5.2 Knowledge Transfer Policies
Information about the transfer of the diaspora’s human capital for the purposes of home country
development, however, is much sparser. The research conducted for this thesis was also only
able to uncover limited information about knowledge transfer related policies—attesting to the
lack of such policies and programs in reality. The first recognition of the value of Egyptians’
human capital can be seen in the Egyptian government’s restrictive emigration policies which
were in effect before the 1960s and mostly remained till Sadat’s infitah. The Egyptian
government at the time at least partially recognized the importance of the skills that Egyptians
possessed for the development of Egypt and as previously mentioned had composed quotas for
the emigration of Egyptians in the fields of medicine, dentistry, pharmacology, nursing,
chiropractory, veterinary, engineering, architecture, statistics, and high school teachers of
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language, geography and history168. It cannot be said, though, that the government completely
recognized the importance of Egyptian skills since certain fields that were indeed crucial to
Egypt’s development were not allocated quotas (see section 3.2). It seems as though even this
incomplete understanding of the importance of Egyptian human capital disappeared when Sadat
came to power. Following a major shift in emigration policy, it seems as though Egyptian human
capital was no longer seen as being so indispensable—or at least that the benefits resulting from
emigration (such as remittances) were seen as compensating for the loss of Egyptian brains.

Mubark’s first years in power saw the adoption of Law 111 which, as previously mentioned, is
still in effect. This law does seem to at least acknowledge that there is worth to “Egyptian
expertise” abroad. Article 3 states that the Egyptian government and specifically the Egyptian
ministry concerned with emigration shall partake in: “suggesting means of capitalizing on the
expertise and know how of Egyptian scientists abroad in the development and production fields
in their homeland.” Nevertheless, this is the only mention of this throughout the entire law.
Likewise, it is interesting to note here how the law defines useful expertise and know how. It
offers quite a limited conceptualization of what exactly consists of useful human capital referring
only to the “expertise and know how” of “Egyptian scientists.” This focus on Egyptian scientists
is in line with the previous Egyptian regimes’ limited conceptualization of what constitutes as
indispensable human capital. When asked about the superficial nature of this law, Shawky
explained that at the time of the law’s composition the government was unsure of how it was to
exactly benefit from Egyptian brains abroad. Therefore, he explains, they just included a
statement to allude to what they hoped to eventually accomplish. Shawky also explained that
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since the adoption of this law, no other laws have been made to complement or supplement this
law’s statements about how to benefit from the highly skilled Egyptians in the diaspora. No
doubt the absence of qualifying laws or decrees about this subject negatively impairs the
government’s ability to implement an elaborate and well-structured diaspora engagement policy.

The implementation of this section of Article 3, as was mentioned in the law itself, is the
responsibility of the ministry concerned with emigration (which was the Ministry of State for
Emigration and is currently the MME). It is useful to also look at the vision, mission, and
objectives of the Emigration Sector to assess whether or not it really has been concerned with the
implementation of a policy that capitalizes on the diaspora’s human capital. We find that the
Emigration Sector’s “vision” only alludes to the potential “exchange of benefits between
migrants and their homeland” without specifically referring to the possibility of knowledge
transfer169. An excerpt from the Emigration Sector’s mission statement also only alludes to the
role the Egyptian diaspora could have in instigating Egypt’s development process without
specifically referring to its role in transferring their expertise. It states
In view of the important role performed by Egyptian expatriates in fostering the Egyptian
economy and prompting the process of economic, technological and industrial
development, the Emigration Sector of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, in the
framework of its mandate, is very keen on maintaining its ties with Egyptian migrants
and providing them with the facilitations necessary to contribute to the comprehensive
development strategy, in addition to supporting their potentials inside and outside Egypt.
As can be seen, the Emigration Sector’s mission statement refers to migrants’ contributions to
Egypt’s development but does not refer specifically to migrants’ human capital contributions as
would be expected from the main agency responsible for implementing such a policy.
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We do find, though, mention of knowledge transfer in the Sector’s objectives. Objective number
3 of the Emigration Sector is to: “achieve the maximum capitalization of Egyptian potential
abroad, whether in relation to scientific and research knowledge transfer or to the contribution in
savings to Egyptian development strategies; to support Egyptian capacities inside and outside
Egypt170.” This objective’s conceptualization of Egyptian expertise is more encompassing than
Law 111’s conceptualization as it refers to both “scientific and research knowledge.” The
distinction between the two probably relates to the outdated nature of Law 111 vis-à-vis the more
recent formulation of the sector’s objectives. It is worth pointing out, though, that the
capitalization of Egyptians abroad is equated to either knowledge transfer or remittances. The
way in which the objective is worded seems to give the impression that knowledge transfer and
remittances are equal in terms of importance. This is slightly disconcerting as many have now
come to see the knowledge and skills of members of the diaspora as an asset that is potentially
more significant to the economic development of a country than the mobilization of financial
resources171. It is also disconcerting because of the two ways the government could capitalize on
Egyptians abroad, in practice, it is much easier to benefit from the diaspora’s financial capital
(especially remittances) than it is to benefit from the diaspora’s human capital—which our
research seems to suggest may actually be the case.

Another way to assess whether or not the Egyptian government has formulated policies that
recognize the importance of the knowledge, experience, and skills that the diaspora possesses is
to examine the main ruling party’s policies. For the majority of the “current phase” of Egyptian
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emigration, the main ruling party was the National Democratic Party (NDP). Channeling the
diaspora’s human capital does not seem to have been a priority for the NDP, although mention of
the topic was not completely absent. In the 9th NDP Conference that took place in 2007, for
instance, one of the main topics discussed was the Egyptian diaspora172. One of the conference’s
final recommendations was that more attention be paid to solving the Egyptian diaspora’s
problems. Another recommendation was concerned with finding ways to make use of Egypt’s
scientists in the diaspora173. It is fascinating to find that twenty-four years after the emergence of
Egypt’s law that states that the Egyptian government must find ways to benefit from the
diaspora’s expertise, that the main ruling party was still issuing a recommendation to that same
end. This no doubt points to the serious possibility that Law 111 could not have been
implemented as was originally formulated. We will now examine how the government has
actually been implementing this policy.

Instead of just focusing on the activities of the Emigration and Egyptians Abroad Sector of the
MME we have instead decided to also examine the activities of the MOHESR and the MOFA
since we have seen in our assessment of the previous two policy types that in practice the MME
is not always the main implementing agency. This decision was also made after careful analysis
of the experiences of other diaspora engaging countries whose experiences have brought to light
the crucial role other such ministries (especially ones related to higher education and research)
have played in facilitating the transfer of their diasporas’ human capital. As an alternative to
172

Sahar Abd-El-Rahman, “The 9th Conference for the NDP Recommends Solving the Diaspora’s Problems,” Al
Ahram, November, 7, 2007. http://www.news-bank.net/cached-version.aspx?id=hrm144025&highlight=%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%20%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%
D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%
20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1
173

Ibid.

examining the policy scene ministry by ministry, we have instead decided to adhere to Gamlen’s
policy typology and examine Egypt’s knowledge transfer policies program by program. Gamlen
divides knowledge transfer programs into two types: TOKTEN and the virtual cluster approach.
We find this typology to be limiting, and instead we will simply review all initiatives and
programs even if they do not fit exactly into Gamlen’s typology. We have divided the initiatives
into the following sections: the TOKTEN program, databases, conferences and workshops,
cooperation and joint projects, and finally virtual participation.

5.3 TOKTEN Program
We will begin by examining the TOKTEN program which is the oldest and supposedly most
established of Egypt’s knowledge transfer programs. The TOKTEN program as briefly
mentioned in section 2.2 is a United Nations’ project aimed at transferring the knowledge and
experience of expatriates in the diaspora to their home country. It was one of the first programs
established worldwide with the goal of reversing brain drain in countries with high rates of
emigration and specifically highly skilled emigration. Egypt seems to have been amongst the
first countries to implement this program in 1980 through a partnership with the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in Egypt. The ASRT housed in the MOHESR was and continues
to be the implementing Egyptian governmental agency. Technical cooperation and cost sharing
between the ASRT and the UNDP continued until 1994. Ever since 1994, however, the ASRT
has been fully responsible for the project174.
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According to the project’s website, “there exists an important untapped potential source of
knowledge represented in its [Egypt’s] Expatriate Nationals. In order to transfer knowledge to
Egypt, there should be a brain-drain reversal giving Egypt the opportunity to benefit from the
knowledge175.” To this end, the TOKTEN program obtains the services of specialists in the
diaspora for short assignments in Egypt for a duration of two to four weeks. In an effort to make
an effective contribution, the specialist’s visit may be extended till six weeks and or may be
repeated a second time in that same year. The TOKTEN program is responsible for funding the
plane tickets for these consultants while the hosting institution is responsible for paying
consultants’ per diem176. The sectors in which specialists contribute are supposed to be key
sectors of the Egyptian economy that correspond to the priorities of the National Development
Plan. The website explains that the project is also meant to culminate in the creation of links
between organizations in Egypt and organizations in diaspora-hosting countries. As a result of
the creation of these, it is hoped that training opportunities would be created and instruments,
equipment, and knowledge would be transferred to institutions in Egypt.

An ASRT publication states that the TOKTEN project has been able to bring in more than half of
the experts who have been employed in scientific missions at the highest level of national bodies
i.e. ministries, universities, research centers, associations, and companies during the duration of
the project. Members of the Egyptian diaspora in the U.S. have composed by far the
overwhelming majority of expatriates consulted through the TOKTEN program with over 350
Egyptians residing in the U.S. consulted since the beginning of the program. The next largest
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group of Egyptians consulted is from the Egyptian diaspora in Canada with over sixty experts
consulted since the beginning of the project. Experts from other countries such as Germany, the
UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Norway, Czech Republic, Switzerland,
Spain, Hungary, and Belgium have also been consulted177. However, besides Germany and the
UK, the experts consulted from these other countries have been quite limited with about ten or
less experts consulted from each of these other countries. A senior official at the ASRT admitted
that there is a need to expand geographically in order to cooperate with institutions that are
outside of the U.S. and Canada.

Consultations throughout the duration of the project have varied widely. The highest number of
consultations that have ever taken place was thirty-seven and occurred during the first year of the
project. Since that year, the number of consultation has never exceeded thirty-seven and has only
ever come close during the first six years of the project. It is interesting to note that a major
decline in the number of consultations occurred during the years of 1988-1991 with an average
of only about four consultations taking place each year178. When asked about this dip in activity,
a senior official in the ASRT explained that it has nothing to do with the project itself and that
the number of officials consulted was based on the needs of institutions in Egypt at that time.
However, Badran explained in an interview that the pace of activity in the TOKTEN program
highly depends on the president of the ASRT who is either able to increase the level of activity
of the ASRT or totally depress it. We can also predict that this depression had to do with the
political situation and instability at that time-especially with the Gulf War going on during the
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latter part of this period. Following the year 1992 the number of consultations did increase again,
nonetheless, it never really reached its original levels179. This does not seem to be related to
issues of funding though as even when the project was co-funded with the UNDP till 1994, the
number of consultations was still not very high. Likewise there was not a dip in the number of
consultations following the withdrawal of UNDP funding. It is interesting to note that the pace of
consultations decelerated again starting the year 1999 but started to accelerate again with an
average number of seventeen consultations made during each year of the period of 2005-2009180.
When asked whether the project was negatively affected by the recent Egyptian revolution, a
senior official at the ASRT explained that at first some members of the Egyptian diaspora were
afraid to visit Egypt but that this did not last long and consultations have resumed their normal
course. Nevertheless, we were not able to verify this since no records were available for the last
two years of the project at the ASRT.

In regards to the fields in which experts were consulted, they have been numerous and have
included the following: space engineering, research & development, laser research,
infrastructure, pharmacy, water sources, urban planning, communications, energy, medicine,
industrial production, mining, nutrition, electronics, environment, bioengineering, and new
materials181. The field that witnessed the highest number of experts of these was industrial
production, closely followed by electronics, and then followed en suite by medicine. Energy was
also a field in which many experts were consulted. Originally, according to the objectives of the
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project, these fields were meant to correlate to the priorities in Egypt’s National Development
Plan. It is interesting to note, however, that a field such as research and development only
witnessed four consultations throughout the entire period of 1980-2005182. When asked on what
basis these fields were chosen, a senior official at the ASRT explained that they were based on
the needs of home institutions and that the ASRT did not filter them in any way. This definitely
goes to show that the project was not implemented as was formulated; it is also a major
weakness of the project.

Although the ASRT’s publication claims that “Egypt has achieved great success in managing
and implementing the idea of this global project and benefit from it, 183” this does not seem to be
the case. The project’s implementation seems to have deteriorated with time as can be seen in the
decreased number of consultations that followed the initial six years of the project. The project’s
website also simply does not seem to have been updated since 1998 when it was created. The
data on the project that is uploaded on the website is incredibly outdated with information posted
only until the year 1998. Likewise, the background information on the project that is posted on
the website still claims that the project is co-funded with the UNDP although this is definitely no
longer the case. Besides the outdated website, however, there are other signs that the project is
not being implemented as one would hope. The attitude of the ASRT employee in charge of the
TOKTEN program was surprising. When asked about the TOTKEN program and the data, he
was not immediately willing to provide any information claiming that such data was confidential
and that it should not be given out as it can be used for “incorrect purposes.” Such an attitude in
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regards to data about the project is highly disconcerting as this is not the spirit that should be
associated with a project whose main goal is to share and transfer knowledge.

Amr Ezzat Salama, former minister of the MOHESR, also explained that the TOKTEN programs
is not very effective due to the fact that in reality visiting scholars only spend about two weeks at
the host Egyptian institution. Hence, he explained that this brief visit does not allow for a very
big impact on the host institution. Also, as briefly mentioned above, the number, origin, and
fields of consultations that have taken place do not seem to have been highly effective especially
following the first six years of the project. Likewise, one of the main aims of this project was that
through the course of these consultations links between home and host country institutions would
be established and that activities outside the scope of the TOKTEN program would be realized.
A senior official in the ASRT admits, however, that to his knowledge no such links have been
established. He also added that there needs to be greater links between home and host country
institutions in order for the project’s activities to increase. Increased funding would also benefit
the program, he explained, as it would allow greater room for advertisement of the project and
hopefully better results. The idea that this is the state of Egypt’s most established knowledge
transfer program is highly disconcerting; however, we will now look at the rest of related
initiatives in order to get a better idea of the state of knowledge transfer programs in Egypt.

5.4 Databases of the Diaspora and of the Diaspora’s Experts
Perhaps one of the most important activities that a government interested in engaging with its
diaspora and more specifically interested in benefiting from its diaspora’s human capital must
undertake is the creation of a database. As is the case with any subject, the availability of reliable

information on the subject paves the way for effective policy making and implementation. This
is no doubt the case with diaspora engagement; the creation of a reliable database has also been
found to be especially essential for purposes of knowledge transfer. Yohannes Woldentensae,
when speaking of the African Diaspora, argues that “the establishment of [a] database on the
brain drain is crucial to promote networking and collaboration between African Diaspora and
institutions in the country of origin184.” Furthermore, Woldentensae explains that this database
should be generated so as to provide information on both the size and composition of the
diaspora with regards to the expertise available. Databases should contain detailed information
about the occupational categories of highly skilled members of the diaspora. One would hope
that Egypt, a major labor-sending country for numerous decades, would have established an
extensive and reliable database of its Egyptians abroad by now. Our research uncovered that
there have in fact been efforts to establish such a database. We will now review these efforts.

We will begin by examining the database created by the ASRT as this was part of the TOKTEN
project that we have just discussed above. According to the ASRT’s publication, through the
TOKTEN project, an electronic database of the diaspora was created. One would assume that
this would be one of the most established and comprehensive databases of Egypt as the project
has been running for 32 years. We find, however, that the ASRT’s database includes data on
approximately 1500 Egyptian experts from 14 countries185. This database is not only limited in
terms of the number of Egyptian experts it has classified, but is also limited in terms of the
number of countries included. Moreover, a senior official at the ASRT admitted that
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“unfortunately, the database has not been updated recently.” He attributed mistrust between
Egyptians and the Egyptian government as the main reason for the diaspora’s unwillingness to
volunteer information about themselves to the ASRT. It is also important to note here that as can
be expected from a database created by the ASRT it is only a database of scientists and hence
leaves out a lot of other skilled professionals that could be of benefit to Egypt’s development.

It was interesting to find that the ASRT similarly has a “library” of experts’ files that is classified
by fields of science and country of origin. This library of experts’ files contains information on
previous consultations, reports, and most significant achievements and publications186. While
this sounds like a promising database, it was disappointing to find that this database only
contains information about experts who have actually been consulted through the TOKTEN
program who number no more than about 500 experts187. Such numbers are no doubt very small
when compared to the number of Egyptian experts in the diaspora. This “library” of experts and
the TOKTEN database of scientists cannot be very useful as they are only really used by the
ASRT to assist in the search for appropriate consultants for the TOKTEN program. Access to the
databases is closed off and hence the databases are not used by other bodies or agencies for other
purposes.

A look at the objectives of the Emigration Sector listed earlier in section 4.2 proves that the
creation of a database is in fact one of its main objectives. Objective number four of the Sector is
to “establish an integrated database on Egyptians abroad, emigration markets, and migration; to
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regulate legislations in the countries of destination188.” It would make sense then that such a
comprehensive database would have been created by now.

It seems as though by the year 2001 such a database still had not been created. One of the goals
of the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) project, which was first implemented in
2001, was to build the capacity of the Emigration sector in order for it to be able to better
facilitate and manage Egyptian out-migration for the purposes of development189. Retraining and
reorganizing staff members in the Emigration Sector was the one of IMIS project’s main
activities. It was believed that of those retrained there would be a distinct team in charge of
compiling a database of Egyptians abroad190. Egyptian officials claimed, when speaking to the
press, that the creation of such a database is important so that the Egyptian government could
benefit from the experience of scientists in various fields of development. It was also seen as
important because it could help the Egyptian government encourage diaspora members to remit
and invest their savings in investment projects in Egypt191. It was said that the MME and the
MOFA would cooperate together in this since the MOFA’s diplomatic missions abroad were
seen as being most suitable for the collection of information on members of the diaspora and
their skills.
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The reality of the situation is, however, that over ten years later and multiple employees of the
MME have expressed that such a comprehensive database still does not really exist. Farrag
explained that there was the intention of composing a database and that specific forms were
created by the MME to be filled out by diaspora members. When asked about the number of
diaspora members included in the database so far he explained that no one actually has access to
this database. Tantawy also confirmed this stating that a complete database still does not exist
and that it is one of the biggest obstacles to effective diaspora engagement. It is hard to believe,
then, that such an incomplete database that no one actually has access to could be very effective
in identifying highly skilled Egyptians in the diaspora who could be engaged for the purposes of
channeling their human capital. It also seems as though cooperation between the MOFA and
MME in the creation of this database has not been very strong. Farrag argued that the ministry’s
actions in this sense are of a competitive nature instead of a complementary nature. This could
definitely be the case since the MOFA seems to be working on a database itself. Minessy
explained that the MOFA is currently working on the compilation of a database of Egyptians
abroad. He explained that the MOFA has recently upgraded their strategy of data collection to
include new forms of information technology mainly websites and social media platforms such
as Twitter and Facebook. He added that these methods are actually proving to be effective in
reaching Egyptians abroad. It would be interesting to see, in the future, how these efforts
materialize.

Another initiative was later taken towards the establishment of a database of Egyptian scientists
in the diaspora in the year 2010. A cooperation protocol was signed by CAPMAS and an
Egyptian NGO named The Age of Science (headed by Essam Sharaf former minister of the

Ministry of Transportation and later prime minister). The two bodies were to cooperate in the
establishment of a database that detailed the achievements of Egyptians abroad and how to best
use them. Following the creation of this database, the Age of Science was to actively find ways
for Egyptian experts abroad to assist in the development of Egypt 192. It is interesting to note that
although there is cooperation here with a governmental body, the main implementing agency is a
nongovernmental organization. Such a development can be seen as an indication of the failure of
the Egyptian government to create an accurate and comprehensive database. When asked about
the project’s implementation, Mohamed Abdu of the Age of Science explained that the database
was indeed compiled. However, he explained that the database was of any Egyptian inside or
outside Egypt who had obtained a PhD and not specifically of Egyptian scholars in the diaspora.
Furthermore, he clarified that this database only contained information on Egyptians abroad who
had obtained their PhD through an official governmental scholarship and therefore did not
contain all Egyptians who had obtained their PhD abroad. The database, although complete, has
yet to be publicized and is yet to be used for any purposes, Abdu clarified. Although it is too
early to judge the success of this project, the database only includes Egyptians who had gone
abroad through official governmental sponsorship and therefore fails to include a large majority
of Egyptian scholars who are currently abroad. Likewise, the database still has not been
publicized and hence no one has actually used it to call upon the skills and expertise of scholars
abroad. It seems as though even this effort has not succeeded at truly establishing the type of
database that is needed for true knowledge transfer from the diaspora.

5.5 Conferences and Workshops for the Highly Skilled Diaspora
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We have seen in the experiences of other countries that engage with their diasporas that often
conferences and workshops are hosted to facilitate links, interaction, and knowledge transfer
between highly skilled members in diasporas and home country professionals, academics, and
institutions. In this section we will first review conferences and workshops that have been hosted
by various agencies of the Egyptian government towards this end. Because there have been an
extremely limited number of conferences completely hosted by the government towards this end,
we will then also look at the conferences that have been hosted by nongovernmental
organizations in cooperation with governmental agencies.

Previously in this chapter we had mentioned that an annual conference for the diaspora has been
hosted by the Egyptian government but that in reality it was only actually hosted on occasion.
Although none of these conferences were hosted for the specific purpose of transferring the
diaspora’s human capital, it is still important to reexamine these conferences under this section
also as they have been one of the main forms of interaction with the highly skilled diaspora and
most likely one of the ways in which the government has proceeded to try and extract obligations
from the diaspora. It is important then to examine these conferences and assess whether or not
the Egyptian government has recognized the diaspora’s human capital and tried to benefit from it
during these conferences.

We have previously mentioned that when Aisha Abdel Hady became minister of the MME in
2006 she soon after reinstated the idea of a general conference for Egyptians abroad. For
instance, a conference was held on August 26th 2007 for Egyptians abroad and was hosted under
the auspices of Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and was chaired by Aisha Abdel Hady.

This conference was also attended by various other ministers and government officials.
Approximately 200 members of the Egyptian diaspora attended the conference—they seemed to
be mostly from the United States and Canada with some others from Europe and the Arab
countries. We were interested to find that the slogan for this conference was “new thoughts on
prospects for development193.” Under this heading, four main themes were addressed during the
conference: prospects for investment in Egypt, investment in real estate and agriculture in Egypt,
investment opportunities in North Sinai and Qena, and investment in education and tourism 194.
Basically the entire conference revolved around advertising to Egyptians abroad investment
opportunities in Egypt. It seems as though the government believed that the best way to achieve
the development of Egypt was only through the transfer of the diaspora’s financial capital with
no mention of the importance of the transfer of its human capital.

A quick look at the conference proceedings of the last annual diaspora conference hosted in 2009
also brings to light the government’s complete negligence of the topic of highly skilled
Egyptians abroad and knowledge transfer. Of the four sessions held, none of these sessions were
planned to discuss the diaspora’s human capital contributions; the focus was instead on the
development of Egypt through the provision of investment opportunities to diaspora members,
political rights of the diaspora (or why it was impractical to have absentee voting), and services
available to the diaspora.
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services and for greater political rights and on the other hand extracting obligations from them in
the form of investments. In the conference’s recommendations, however, two recommendations
were made that relate to Egyptians abroad participating in home country development through
knowledge transfer. This probably points to the fact that although the Egyptian government did
not find this topic important enough to dedicate a session to it, the topic still emerged most likely
as a result from suggestions from members in the diaspora. The two recommendations read as
follows:
1) Professionals conferences to be held in different sectors, first to begin with is a
conference for scientists, for scientific interaction to benefit the research and the
researchers in their homeland
2) Allowing the Egyptians Abroad to share in the establishments of the educational
buildings196.
The first of these recommendations relates to the establishment of specific conferences in each
field so as to facilitate the contributions of highly skilled diaspora members to the research
ongoing in Egypt. The fact that this recommendation was made in the year 2009 indicates that no
such conferences actually exist till this day with this purpose in mind. The second
recommendation made relates to allowing the Egyptian diaspora the right to participate in the
establishment of educational facilities in Egypt. From these recommendations it is apparent that
until quite recently the Egyptian government had not done much towards this end.

In regards to the actualization of these recommendations, Shawky who was one of the
conferences’ attendees explains that although multiple good recommendations arose from this
conference, nothing really materialized. Shawky attributed this failure to Egyptian bureaucracy
arguing that it is the main detriment to the realization of these recommendations and to the
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realization of many similar good ideas. The latter of these recommendations though, related to
the role diaspora members could play in education in Egypt, seems to have been taken somewhat
seriously as will be later discussed in section 5.6.

As can be seen, the latest conferences hosted by the Egyptian government have been mostly
geared at attracting remittances and investors from the diaspora. None of the sessions of either
conference were devoted to the topic of facilitating the human capital contributions of Egyptians
in the diaspora. Minessy stated that there is currently another conference of this type being
planned for this coming summer probably to take place in July 2012. Although no information
has been made public about this conference yet, we will be curious to see whether or not there
will be a positive shift in the direction these conferences take. It will be interesting to see if the
spirit of revolution and reform has awakened interest in improving the state of scientific and
research knowledge in Egypt with the assistance of qualified individuals in the Egyptian
diaspora.

We will now refer to the second set of conferences that have been hosted in Egypt over the years
for the diaspora. These conferences are interesting to us not only because they have been geared
towards the diaspora but because they have been specifically geared towards highly skilled
members of the diaspora. Although they are not really considered complete governmental
initiatives, they have been hosted by an NGO named Friends of Egyptian Scholars Abroad
(FOESA) with the cooperation of the Egyptian government (mainly the MME). The idea for
these conferences originated from the FOESA which was founded in the early 1970s and aimed
to contribute to the enrichment of thought and to participate in serious scientific efforts in order

to work towards the goals of economic development. Badran, former president of the FOESA,
explains that FOESA was created in recognition of the role Egyptians abroad could play in
helping Egypt with the problems it was encountering during the age of globalization. These
conferences also aimed to mobilize Egyptian scholars abroad for the purpose of engaging them
in Egypt’s development. Towards this end FOESA, with the assistance of the Egyptian
government, has hosted 16 different conferences on a biannual basis beginning in 1974 and
ending in 2005197.

The main goal of these conferences has been the strengthening of ties between Egyptian experts
in Egypt and in the diaspora and benefiting from the expertise of Egyptian scholars abroad.
These conferences seem to have been at least partially successful in doing this as Egyptian
scholars abroad, as well as highly skilled diaspora associations such as the Association for
Egyptian-American Scholars, have attended and presented papers in these conferences. Badran
claims that these conferences have been very successful and that many Egyptian scholars abroad
attended over the years with much zeal. It is interesting to note that these conferences have been
held in various areas of science and development198. As can be seen in the table below, the
conferences seem to have touched upon many of Egypt’s development priorities.
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Table 5.1: FOESA Conferences 1974-2005
Year

Conference Title

1974

Organizing Modes of Communication with Egyptian Scholars Abroad

1974

Development of the Desert

1978

Development of the Countryside as Source of Complete Development

1980

Development under the Umbrella of Peace

1982

The Role of Science and Technology in Egyptian Development

1984

Environmental Problems of Development

1986

Economic Development in Egypt

1988

Education in Egypt

1990

Egypt’s Human Resources

1992

Water Resources and Development in Egypt

1994

Energy and Continuous Development in Egypt

1996

Unemployment in Egypt

1998

Development of the Desert in the Third Millennium

2001

Modernizing Egypt

2003

Human Development in the Third Millennium

2005

Information Technology and its Role in Development

Source: Badran, Ibrahim. Interview by Iman Dawood. Cairo, Egypt. April 22, 2012.

Furthermore, we found that the success of these conferences, at least in the beginning, can be
traced, at least in part, to the Egyptian government’s commitment. Although FOESA was the

main organizer of these conferences, the ministry concerned with emigration at the time played a
large role in these conferences. The government was responsible for both sponsoring and funding
these conferences. These conferences seem to have been most effective during the first decade.
After about the first ten years of conferences, however, Badran explains that the economic
situation of the country deteriorated and the United Nations had to assist the government in
funding these conferences. Dessouki also explained in an interview that although these
conferences were effective in the beginning, they gradually decreased in effectiveness. It seems
as though besides funding problems, FOESA itself began to have internal problems especially
after the death of its president Mahmoud Mahfouz. Badran also traces this decreasing
effectiveness to the deteriorating role of the MME which he believes has dwarfed over the years.

The final set of conferences we will review in this thesis is one hosted by the Association of
Egypt-American Scholars (AEAS). An NGO founded in 1971, the AEAS is similar to the
FOESA in that it aims to contribute to the scientific and cultural development of Egypt. It has
approximately 600 members who reside in either Canada or the United States199. This AEAS has
been formally recognized by the Egyptian government and has hosted, under the sponsorship of
the Egyptian government, multiple annual conferences. Some of these annual conferences have
been hosted abroad while others have been hosted in Egypt. Both the 2006 and 2008
conferences, for instance, have been held in Egypt. The 2006 conference was held in the
National Research Centre in Cairo under the patronage of Hany Helal, former minister of the
MOHESR and Hany El Nazer, President of the National Research Centre. This conference’s
theme was: “Enhancement of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Egypt.” Alongside
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this conference there was another meeting with members of AEAS with Hany Helal where
programs such as the establishment of Centers of Excellence, the Higher Education
Enhancement Program, Egypt E-Learning University, and Faculty Leadership Development
Program were discussed200. In 2008 the theme of the conference was “Cooperation between
Egyptian Scholars and Scholars Abroad.” The conference was once again hosted under the
patronage of Hany Helal but this time at the Supreme Council of Universities on the Cairo
University Campus. Approximately 500 conference delegates and guests including leaders of
higher education in Egypt, university presidents, and heads of research institutions attended this
conference201. It is important to note, however, that the government role in these conferences
seems to be quite limited. Salama explained in an interview that besides sponsoring these
conferences the government didn’t do much else.

5.6 Cooperation and Joint Projects
The nature of our highly transnational world has allowed many countries to benefit from the
participation of highly skilled diaspora members in home country projects. Cooperation between
highly skilled members of the diaspora and home country scholars, professionals, and
policymakers is now possible via both actual temporary visits to the homeland and virtual
participation. This section will discuss the Egyptian government’s attempts at involving highly
skilled diaspora members in home country projects via actual visits. The next section of this
chapter will discuss the Egyptian government’s attempts at the virtual participation of the
diaspora.
200

“2006 Conference,” AEAS Scholars, http://www.aeascholars.org/conferences/conf_2006.php. (Accessed April
17, 2012).
201

“2008 Conference,” AEAS Scholars, http://www.aeascholars.org/openingceremony.php (Accessed April 17,
2012).

It seems as though the Egyptian government has particularly recognized the benefits that can be
accrued from cooperation with highly skilled diaspora members, especially scholars and
scientists, in the fields of education and research in Egypt. Salama explains that the government
has enlisted the services of diaspora members particularly in the field of education and scientific
research. In 2005, for example, the government invited diaspora members to partake in the
formulation and planning of Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policy. Numerous
scholars from the diaspora attended the STI conference held in Cairo towards that end. One of
the main sessions of the conference was on how to best benefit from the diaspora’s skills and
expertise. According to Salama this was one of the beneficial forms of knowledge transfer that
have taken place. Similarly, the Egyptian government has previously invited members of the
Egyptian diaspora to join the Supreme Council of Scientific Research. The main reason behind
this, according to Salama, relates to the government’s recognition of the value of the expertise in
the diaspora.

It also seems as though the government has recognized the benefits that could be accrued from
enlisting the services of Egyptians from the diaspora in the evaluation and accreditation process
of the educational institutions in Egypt. The Ministry of International Cooperation (MOIC)
approved a budget of one million dollars to this end in December of 2009 202. These funds were
to assist the government in the identification and selection of Egyptian scientists in the diaspora
and then in the design and implementation of workshops to channel this expertise. The National
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Authority for Quality Assurance & Accreditation of Egypt (NAQAAE) is currently the main
body responsible for the implementation of this program. As can be seen in their initiative’s
conceptual framework, NAQAAE seems to be well aware of the benefits that can be amassed
through cooperation with highly skilled Egyptians in the diaspora. The conceptual framework
reads:











Our conviction that education can be developed only by Egyptian brains.
Our human resources outside of Egypt is a natural extension of the Egyptian main
Societal Capital.
Our deep belief that Egyptian scientists abroad will give their time and
experience only when they feel that the country is committed and have a clear
vision for educational development and that they are an integral part
of educational reform
Egyptian scientists abroad reached the critical mass with diversified experience in
almost all areas of knowledge.
The understanding that Quality Assurance of educational institutions is the
gateway to our educational reform.
Establishing a sustainable functional linkage between NAQAAE and Egyptian
international scholars.
Establishing institutional linkage between NAQAAE and international
educational institutions through the Egyptian scholars
Casting substantial transparency on the evaluation process by Internationalization
of the reviewers team
Transferring the good practices and the accumulative experience of the Egyptian
scholars to our educational institutions203

In an effort to implement this conceptual framework, NAQAAE held its first meeting with
diaspora members in June 9-10, 2010. Although its effectiveness is unclear, approximately 100
scholars from the diaspora working in the United States, Canada, and Europe attended the
meeting. Multiple workshops in different disciplines such as engineering, medicine, and
technology were also held throughout these days204. It is unclear whether or not NAQAAE has
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held another meeting towards this end as there is no mention of such a second meeting for
diaspora experts. Hence, we are unable to determine whether this was a onetime attempt or
whether NAQAAE has actually successfully implemented its conceptual framework and
facilitated the transfer of knowledge from diaspora members. Nevertheless, it seems as though
the lack of updates on NAQAAE’s website signifies that there has not been much follow up
following this first meeting.

Another similar move towards the establishment of cooperation between scholars in the diaspora
and scholars at home relates to the establishment of educational facilities. Salama explains that
the government has indeed invited Egyptians from the diaspora to partake in the development of
universities in Egypt. The first example of this, he explains, was the consultation of Egyptian
scholars abroad in matters related to the establishment of Nile University. Likewise, the Egyptian
cabinet’s approval of the establishment of Zewail’s City of Science on Technology on May 11,
2011 is another example of this205. This approval signifies the Egyptian government’s readiness
to allow Egyptian scholars from the diaspora to play a role in the establishment of educational
institutions in Egypt. Once established it seems that Zewail’s City will play a large role in
transferring knowledge from Egyptians in the diaspora as many renowned Egyptians abroad are
already on the university’s board of trustees.

Finally, a note can be said about joint-projects. As apparent in the literature review, governments
such as the Chinese government have often facilitated that participation of their diaspora
members in joint-projects between home-based scholars and professionals. While it is true that
joint-projects of this type have in fact been carried out in Egypt, Salama explains that these joint205
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projects have not been carried out in an organized manner. The Egyptian government does not
seem to have played a central role in the setting up of these projects or in facilitating them.
Instead, any joint projects that have been conducted of this type have been as a result of the
individual efforts and initiatives of scholars and professionals either in the diaspora or in home
country institutions. It seems as though programs aimed at facilitating the establishment of joint
projects are unfortunately missing from the Egyptian government’s knowledge transfer policy.

5.7 Virtual Participation
As we have briefly mentioned before, the emergence of new information and communication
technologies has been one of the main reasons behind the increased interest in diasporas. These
new technologies have aided in the transnationalization of the world and have allowed members
of the diaspora to continue to take part in home country affairs while still physically being in
their host country. So as opposed to physical forms of participation discussed such as the
TOKTEN program, conferences and workshops, cooperation and joint projects discussed above,
new technologies have particularly facilitated what is often referred to as the virtual participation
of diaspora members. This is what Gamlen has termed as the virtual cluster approach to
knowledge transfer206. Woldentensae also discusses this type of knowledge transfer explaining
that “virtual participation provides opportunities for involvement of the intellectual Diaspora in
activities such as module preparation for distance teaching and e-learning, sharing of information
with local counterparts, collaboration on researches and other development projects207.”
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Such uses of information and communication technologies seem largely absent from any
Egyptian governmental activities. The only mention of the use of such technologies can be seen
more than ten years ago in the year 2000 when Ahmed El Amaway, minister of the MME at the
time, had announced a new program for the diaspora. This new program was aimed at both
improving the services of the Egyptian government for Egyptians in the diaspora and for
facilitating links with highly skilled members in the diaspora and benefiting from their
experience and skills. One of the components of this new program involved the use of video
conference technology to organize seminars with the diaspora208. The main topic of these
seminars was on how to best achieve the participation of the Egyptian diaspora in development
projects and transfer its knowledge. When asked about this program, Farrag who has been an
official in the Emigration Sector of the MME for twelve years explained that in reality no such
virtual participation by the diaspora had taken place. He clarified that just because a program was
announced or written about in newspapers does not mean it actually took place in reality. He also
argued that everything published about the activities of the MME, especially starting in 2001
through 2009 painted a “rosy” image of the situation. He said that you cannot actually trust
anything written during this time. Hence, it seems as though the Egyptian government has not
been able to facilitate the virtual participation of Egyptians in the diaspora and has not been able
to channel their skills and expertise in this way.
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Woldentensae adds to the definition of virtual participation though expanding it to include
different types of virtual participation. He explains that the transnational nature of this world
allows other means of participation by the diaspora through “remote resource mobilization such
as donation of books for high schools, sending computer facilities to enhancing the use of ICT in
universities or providing medical equipments for local hospitals”209. This more than the previous
type of virtual participation may be more present in the case of Egypt. Although there are no
concrete programs to facilitate such remote resource mobilization, interviews conducted with
state officials who had previously been posted in areas where the Egyptian diaspora is hosted
expressed how this type of participation does indeed occur although in a dispersed and unofficial
manner. Elgemeie explained, for example, that when he was a cultural attaché for the MOHESR
in Berlin that he often oversaw the resource mobilization of this type. He says that he organized
many donations of medical equipment for example. Dessouki also explained during an interview
that there have been various cases where members of the Egyptian diaspora (especially
academics) have mobilized the donation of books for Egyptian public universities. It seems as
though perhaps this indirect form of virtual participation is more common and has occurred as a
result of personal initiatives as opposed to governmental initiatives.

5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at the Egyptian government’s attempts at extracting obligations from
its diaspora through investment policies. Since the highly skilled diaspora’s human capital is the
focus of our research, we devoted the majority of this chapter to examining the knowledge
transfer policies and programs of the Egyptian government as opposed to the other forms of
investment policies such as diaspora investment. Acknowledgement of the importance of the
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diaspora’s human capital was found in Law 111, the MME’s policy documents, and the NDP’s
statements. Nevertheless beyond a simple acknowledgement and a declaration of intent to find
ways to benefit from this human capital, Egypt did not have any other formulated policies
specific to this purpose. It is not surprising, then, that we were unable to find too many
governmental initiatives towards this end. We were able to find and reviewed in this chapter: the
TOKTEN program, databases for the highly skilled diaspora, conferences hosted for the diaspora
and specifically for scholars and experts in the diaspora, cooperation and joint projects, and
incomplete attempts by the government to achieve the virtual participation of the Egyptian
diaspora.

We did not find the TOKTEN program to be of great success mainly as it dwindled in
effectiveness following the first six years of its implementation. The number and duration of
consultations have not been very great and the fields and origins of consulted diaspora members
have also been quite limited and not necessarily in correspondence with the needs of Egypt.
Moreover, the program did not establish the greater goal of creating links between institutions in
Egypt and those in diaspora-hosting countries. We also found that attempts by various agencies
of the Egyptian government to create a database of highly skilled Egyptians in the diaspora have
been numerous yet largely unsuccessful over the years. The number of different bodies
independently trying to establish such a database definitely signifies great redundancy and points
to the lack of coordination in Egypt’s diaspora engagement policies. Likewise, the recent
participation of NGOs in the creation of these databases points to the failure of the Egyptian
government in achieving this and at the need for NGOs to fill this gap. Such a trend can also be
seen in our third activity, conferences and workshops, as these have also been repeatedly held by

NGOs instead of governmental agencies. The ones that have been held by NGOs have no doubt
been more successful than those hosted by the government since such government conferences
have ignored human capital and focused instead on financial capital. It is important to note,
however, that NGO efforts, such as those of the FOESA have not been free of problems
especially as of late. Nonetheless, the recent demise of FOESA although is independent to the
NGO itself is also dependent on the gradual demise of the MME. Finally, we also observed
Egyptian government attempts at the initiation of the virtual participation of the diaspora. We
found that videoconferencing, for example, was only announced but that it did not take place in
reality. Instead we noticed individualized, dispersed, and unofficial forms of virtual participation
initiated by the individuals of the diaspora itself.

As with the capacity building and extending of rights policy types, Egypt’s knowledge transfer
policies are also deeply lacking. However, they are even in a worse state than the previously
discussed policies. Overall they tend to suffer from an incomplete understanding as to how to
best utilize the diaspora’s human capital. This is evidenced by the fact that in no policy
document of the Egyptian government has there been concrete and detailed policies on ways to
achieve the transfer of the diaspora’s human capital. Furthermore, the bodies involved in the
implementation of this policy are numerous and do not seem to coordinate with one another.
There is a complete absence of an overall guiding framework or strategy for knowledge transfer
in Egypt.

As mentioned briefly above, we also observed the participation of multiple NGOs that have been
perhaps playing an even bigger role in facilitating the diaspora’s human capital contributions

then has the Egyptian government itself. It seems as though international NGOs (such as the UN
in the case of the TOKTEN program) as well as national NGOS (such as The Age of Science,
FOEASA, and AESA) have been the main initiators and implementers of knowledge transfer
policies in the absence of serious efforts by the government. Minessy attempted to explain the
reason behind the government’s general negligence by attributing it to what is often referred to
as ‘uqdet-al-khawaja or Westerner’s Complex i.e. Egyptians’ belief that they as Egyptians are
incapable of producing anything valuable, that only the khawaga or the Westerner could produce
something of value, and that anything produced in the West or by the West would be better than
that produced at home. Furthermore, Minessy explained that he lack of serious efforts can be
attributed to the generally low demand for such experts in Egypt—as universities, research
institutions, and other workplaces in Egypt are on the whole uninterested in benefiting from such
qualified personnel. Badran expanded on this by attributing the general negligence of the
government to its deteriorating state over the years. He explained that although many initiatives
were successful in the beginning, they have decreased in effectiveness as has the Egyptian
government (and especially the MME) over the years. It is no surprise then that attempts by the
Egyptian government to benefit from the diaspora’s human capital have not been very serious.
The general failure of the government’s knowledge transfer programs suggests that it is unlikely
that any serious knowledge transfer is taking place as a direct result of their policies and that if
any knowledge transfer is taking place it is most likely happening either through programs of
NGOs or in a haphazard manger through personal initiatives.

CHAPTER SIX:
THESIS CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion
This thesis has examined the state of Egyptian government policies towards highly-highly skilled
emigration in general and the diaspora in specific. We found that Egypt’s policy towards highly
skilled emigration has not changed recently and that it has, since the time of Sadat, continued to
be one of encouraging emigration in order to benefit from the diaspora’s financial capital (e.g.
remittances) and to decrease unemployment at home. We also noted that although at an earlier
time restrictions were in place aimed at inhibiting the flight of specific human capital, such
restrictions have now been removed and Egypt’s policies do not give much serious thought to the
disadvantages associated with the loss of essential Egyptian human capital. Since Egypt’s highly
skilled emigration policies have been quite liberal they have allowed high migration rates and
have led to the creation of a sizable diaspora. We pointed out the increasingly high skill level of
this diaspora and the importance of engaging such a highly skilled diaspora for the purposes of
Egypt’s development.

We then examined Egyptian government policy towards the diaspora utilizing Gamlen’s concept
of “transnational governmentality” and his impending policy typology. We discovered that, like
most countries with large diasporas, Egypt is in fact interested in transnationalizing
governmentality to include its diaspora. We observed that Egypt’s policies towards the diaspora
include capacity building policies that are aimed at symbolically building a nation and
incorporating the diaspora into it with the help of various institutions that have built to help

govern the diaspora. We lamented the deficient set of Egyptian institutions pointing to the lack of
a ministry specific to the diaspora, the weak and ineffective consultative diaspora body, the
uncoordinated and often redundant nature of these policies, and the tension between different
institutions in charge of implementing these policies. Moreover, we observed that Egypt does in
fact extend rights to its diaspora. Politically speaking, the diaspora has had the right to dual
nationality for decades but has only recently been allowed to vote while abroad via their national
ID. We welcomed this development but noted the absence of parliamentary representation for the
diaspora. In terms of social and civil rights, although we found them to exist on paper (vaguely
alluded to in Law 111), in practice we found that the extension of such rights is generally only
relevant to the low skilled diaspora and even then has not been very successful due to the
perceived (and likely actual) inefficiency of Egyptian governmental bodies abroad.

After looking at the government’s capacity building and extending of rights policies, we devoted
the rest of our research to the government’s diaspora policies aimed at extracting obligations via
investment policies from the diaspora and more specifically aimed at transferring knowledge
from the diaspora. Although we did find mention of the importance of the diaspora’s human
capital in Egypt’s formulated policies they were not clearly formulated. Furthermore, we were
not able to find a coherent set of policies aimed at facilitating the diaspora’s human capital
contributions. We did come across a limited number of initiatives aimed at transferring the
diaspora’s human capital such as the TOKTEN program, databases of the highly-highly skilled
diaspora, conferences and workshops, cooperation and joint projects, and virtual participation.
These initiatives were successful to varying degrees but more often than not were initiated or
mainly implemented by an NGO, lacked in implementation, and were quite unfavorable to any

real great knowledge transfer. Likewise, repeated calls for the transfer of the diaspora’s financial
capital seem to have overshadowed any calls for the diaspora’s human capital contributions.
Mistrust between the government and the diaspora was perceived by government officials who
argued that it has impeded the participation of diaspora members in government initiatives.
Finally, the deteriorating state of these programs was noted and was traced to the concurrent
deterioration of Egyptian government institutions and particularly the MME.

It seems as though the Egyptian government’s policies towards skilled emigration and the
diaspora do not compose a clear and comprehensive policy framework (especially since they fail
to seriously acknowledge the benefits that can be amassed from engaging the diaspora and
facilitating its human capital contributions). Likewise, the policies that do exist and are properly
formulated are not always implemented as they are formulated. It is especially important to keep
in mind that the ineffectiveness of the government’s knowledge transfer programs is not only
because of the weakness of the institutions and programs in and of themselves, but because of
the government’s inability to properly pursue the first two types of diaspora engagement policies.
As Gamlen has pointed out, “The strength of states’ claims to legitimately extract benefits from
‘their’ diasporas arguably flows from their reciprocal provision of benefits210.” In other words,
unless the Egyptian government is able to symbolically build a nation state and incorporate the
diaspora into it and extend to it political, social, and civil rights it is unlikely that the diaspora
will be willing to participate in the government’s knowledge transfer programs. The Egyptian
government’s policies are ineffective at engaging with the diaspora and strengthening ties with
them and hence are generally not conducive to knowledge transfer for the purposes of Egypt’s
development. Although some knowledge transfer does no doubt occur, it is does not always take
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place in a systematic manner through government programs but instead often takes place in a
haphazard, individualized, and self-initiated manner.

6.2 Policy Recommendations
The results of this research have identified that Egyptian government policies towards the
diaspora could definitely benefit from being more conducive to both diaspora engagement and
knowledge transfer. Hence, this research will present some policy recommendations aimed at
improving the state of the Egyptian government’s highly skilled emigration and diaspora
engagement policy. These recommendations are also meant to eventually amplify and accelerate
the diaspora’s human capital contributions. Such recommendations are extremely important now
as a change in government and possibly also in policy are imminent for the first time in decades.
We hope these recommendations assist Egypt’s new policymakers in shaping the country’s
future.

Know the Diaspora
As was mentioned many times throughout this thesis, Egypt suffers from a severe absence of
accurate and comprehensive data on Egyptian emigration in general and the diaspora in specific.
Such a paucity of information is deeply troublesome as it makes effectively engaging with the
diaspora incredibly difficult. Perhaps the first step that needs to be taken by the Egyptian
government towards the establishment of a more effective diaspora strategy is that of improving
the quality of data collection. The Egyptian government is in desperate need of accurate and up
to date data about the size of its diaspora, its location, members’ education and skill levels, as

well as members’ occupations. This information should not just be collected about migrants in
the diaspora but other members of the diaspora also. The absence of such data as well as the
absence of a comprehensive database on highly skilled diaspora members is amongst the greatest
obstacles to diaspora engagement and knowledge transfer, for how could a government that does
not know its diaspora engage with and benefit from its diaspora?
Establish a Comprehensive Policy Framework
One of the main findings of this thesis pointed to the absence of a comprehensive emigration
policy framework. We found that although some diaspora engagement policies do exist, they are
not part of a comprehensive emigration policy and they are often not formulated in a way that
makes them effective. The Egyptian government must devise a clear, comprehensive emigration
policy with a diaspora engagement strategy at the center in order to maximize the benefits that
can be amassed from its rich diaspora. This policy framework needs to be composed with the
help of all relevant ministries especially the MOFA, the MME, the MOHESR, the MOI, and the
MOICT. These ministries must cooperate to come up with a better structured emigration policy
and a diaspora engagement strategy that is clear, coherent, and removes all the current
redundancies and inefficiencies. It is especially important to note that both the emigration policy
and diaspora engagement strategy must be directly linked to the development priorities of Egypt
both in formulation and in practice. Likewise, this diaspora strategy must be comprehensive not
only in the sense that it formulates a framework complete with capacity building, extending
rights, and extracting obligations policies, but also in the sense that it incorporates the entire
Egyptian diaspora. One of our findings of this research pointed to the focus of the Egyptian
government only on diaspora members in the United States. Such a narrow focus ignores and
consequently misses out on the benefits that can be amassed from such a rich and diverse

Egyptian diaspora. The strategy should also encompass the diaspora and not just migrants as
there are no doubt a lot of resources that could be useful to Egypt’s development.
Take into Account Differences in the Diaspora
As our historical chapter has shown, the Egyptian diaspora is not uniform. The Egyptian diaspora
is located in both OECD countries and in Arab countries and takes on very different
characteristics in each of these areas and even within these areas. Data about the diaspora needs
to be studied in order for the diaspora engagement strategy to be able to into account these
differences and thus be effective. We have noted that both permanent emigration to OECD
countries and temporary emigration to Arab countries are present in the case of Egypt. We have
also noted differences in skill level between these two areas and between countries within these
areas. We noted for example that the Egyptian diaspora in Italy has a much lower skill level than
that of the diaspora in Canada. Yet we have not noted in Egyptian government policy much
attention to regional differences. The Egyptian government policy is currently focused on
interacting primarily with members of the diaspora hosted in the United States. While this may
seem to make sense since there the diaspora in the United States boasts a high skill level, a focus
on diaspora members in the United States is not sufficient. Egyptian government policy needs be
focused on diaspora members, for example, who work in sectors and occupations that could be
useful to Egypt’s development. The nature of the Egyptian government’s interaction with
diaspora members in OECD countries who are permanently settled should be different than the
Egyptian government’s interaction with diaspora members who are only temporarily in Arab
countries. Hence, after careful analysis of the state of the Egyptian diaspora around the world,
Egyptian government policy needs to be adjusted to reflect nuances within the diaspora.

Consult the Diaspora
While composing the diaspora strategy discussed above, it is crucial for the Egyptian
government to consult the diaspora. Since we have found that many diaspora members feel
mistrust towards the Egyptian government, it is essential that the government invite diaspora
members to share their views on the government’s policies. In order for Egypt’s diaspora
strategy to work it must be coauthored and the diaspora must feel as if it has had a role in
formulating it. Furthermore, the Egyptian government needs to allow for a more independent
diaspora consultative body since as we have seen the General Union for Egyptians Abroad
suffers from many problems. An effective consultative body will also no doubt improve the
chances of more successful diaspora engagement policy that leads to more profound knowledge
transfer through the diaspora.
Establish an Emigration Ministry
As we have seen in several countries with large diasporas, a ministry dedicated to emigration
matters is an important part of successful diaspora engagement. In the case of Egypt even
employees of the MME expressed their concern over the lack of an independent ministry for
emigration and the diaspora. Since Egypt is a country of high migration rates and the Egyptian
diaspora consists of almost 10% of the Egyptian population, it is important to have an effective
institution that deals with emigration matters and serves the diaspora. Establishing such a
ministry would ensure that all three policy types discussed in this paper would be implemented
in a more effective manner. Such a move is very essential as currently no government body has
the capacity to fully engage with the diaspora and maximize the benefits that can be accumulated
from the emigration of so many Egyptians.

Update the Legal Framework
Along with a more comprehensive diaspora engagement policy framework, there is a major need
for an update of Egypt’s legal emigration framework. The current law in place (Law 111) was
passed in 1983 and is no longer that applicable to situation in Egypt. The law is outdated since it
was originally passed before it became clear which governmental bodies in Egypt would be
responsible for each task related to the diaspora. The current law assigns everything to the
“ministry concerned with emigration” although the reality of the matter is that there are multiple
governmental bodies involved in diaspora engagement policy formulation and implementation.
Furthermore, the current law does not clarify enough the rights appointed to the diaspora.
Although a new law was passed to give Egyptians in the diaspora the right to vote, such an
essential right should be included in Egypt’s main emigration law. Finally, it should be noted
that Egypt’s emigration law is very vague in that it does not specify how exactly the government
will benefit from the diaspora’s human capital for example. A more updated legal framework
should include such essential details.
Improve Institutions’ Capacity
As we have mentioned throughout this thesis, there is a major gap (especially in certain areas)
between the formulation of policies and their implementation. In some cases Egypt does have the
appropriate policies but they are simply not implemented as formulated. To decrease this gap it is
essential that the relevant governmental institutions undergo capacity building. Although, for
example, the Emigration Sector of the MME recently underwent capacity building as part of the
IMIS project begun in 2001, such institutions are in desperate need of capacity building. Visits to
these institutions for the purpose of this thesis’ fieldwork brought to light the dire circumstances

of Egypt’s governmental institutions. More attention needs to be paid to the effectiveness of
these institutions. Furthermore, employees of these institutions should be selected in a more
appropriate manner as currently these institutions are lacking the appropriate human capital.
Pay More Attention to Rights of & Services to the Diaspora
This thesis reviewed more than just the Egyptian government’s knowledge transfer programs
since it was understood that for these programs to be successful the Egyptian government must
first effectively implement capacity building and extending services policies. We were distraught
though to find though these policies are not implemented as they are formulated. Such a situation
is cause for distress since the benefits that can be amassed from the diaspora are to a large part
dependent on the Egyptian government’s ability to communicate and maintain strong links with
the diaspora. Moreover, they are dependent on the success of the Egyptian government in
extending to the diaspora the rights and services that would make them feel as though they are
citizens governed by a legitimate sovereign.
Regain the Trust of the Diaspora
The Egyptian government has over the years generally lost legitimacy in the eyes of Egyptians
both home and abroad (as evidenced by the January 2011 uprisings). This is even more so an
issue with agencies that deal directly with Egyptians abroad. Many policymakers in the agencies
visited for the sake of this research expressed that there is mistrust between diaspora members
and the government which leads diaspora members to shy away from engaging with Egyptian
government agencies whether in host or home countries. Such mistrust is extremely damaging
not only because it reduces the effectiveness of attempts by the Egyptian government to reach
out to the diaspora but also because it reduces the effectiveness of any government initiatives

aimed at transferring the diaspora’s human capital. Government bodies need to revamp
themselves and ensure higher quality of services to the diaspora. Furthermore, government
bodies need to advertise these better services in order that they may gradually change their
current negative reputation. Only by regaining the trust of Egyptians in general and the diaspora
in specific will the diaspora seriously engage with the Egyptian government and participate in its
diaspora engagement and knowledge transfer programs.
Make Use of ICT
As has been previously mentioned, one of the main reasons diasporas have gained popularity in
the literature in recent years is definitely related to the emergence of so many new ICT tools. The
Egyptian government must recognize the benefits of the use of such tools and help to make them
available in government institutions and facilities. These new ICT tools would help the Egyptian
government implement virtual participation programs and facilitate joint projects. Likewise,
these new tools could facilitate the emergence of intellectual networks of Egyptians in the
diaspora. The Egyptian government needs to pay more attention to these tools in order for it to
compete in today’s highly knowledge based world.
Coordinate with NGOs
Our research brought forth several notable efforts by NGOs such as FOESA, AEAS, and the Age
of Science. These NGOs all partook in efforts to facilitate knowledge transfer whether through
establishing a database of highly skilled Egyptians or hosting conferences for the transfer of
knowledge from Egyptian scholars in the diaspora. Since these efforts already exist, it is
important for the Egyptian government to coordinate with these bodies in order to remove

redundancies and inefficiencies. NGOs could also play an important role in areas that require the
trust of the diaspora since this is one of the major weaknesses of the Egyptian government.

Coordinate with Host Countries
No doubt one of the most important factors that determine diaspora engagement levels and
impact is host country policy. While such a topic is out of the scope of this research, it is still
important for us to acknowledge the importance of this factor. There are definite benefits to be
amassed from home country coordination with host countries. Diaspora policies need to be
beneficial to the home county, the diaspora, and to host countries. Aligning these three elements
will no doubt increase the chances of success for a country whose institutions suffer from a lack
of capacity.
Elevate Status of Research & Education
Finally, one of the most important moves that could increase the possibility of more profound
knowledge transfer from the Egyptian diaspora relates to the status of research and education in
Egypt. We cannot ignore the collapsing state of research and education in Egypt. In order for the
diaspora’s human capital to benefit Egypt, Egypt must be in a state as to receive it and make use
of it. Hence, a larger budget must be directed towards educational and scientific research
institutions and facilities in Egypt. Research facilities must be upgraded so as to allow Egyptian
diaspora members to operate effectively when they collaborate in joint projects or visit as
consultants. Likewise, a larger budget needs to be allocated for these knowledge transfer
programs.

6.3 Thesis Limitations
It is important to mention here some limitations of this thesis. First of all, as we have previously
mentioned in chapter 1, this thesis mainly concentrated on the Egyptian government’s
formulated policies. In some instances when data was available about initiatives and programs of
the government, this thesis actually assessed their effectiveness such as in the case of the
TOKTEN program. However, this was not the norm as most government bodies visited either
did not possess or did not make available data about their implemented programs. Since such
data was usually not available, this thesis had to depend on interviews with employees of these
government bodies in order to extract information about the programs. Egyptian officials were
interviewed about formulated policies and asked about whether these policies have been
implemented as they were formulated or if there has been a large gap between formulation and
implementation. Officials were also asked about the effectiveness of these policies. This method
was not free of weaknesses, however. Although we were pleasantly surprised to find that
Egyptian officials were generally on the whole willing to constructively critique government
policies, there were exceptions to this. One of the interviewees, for instance, was not willing to
engage in a critical discussion about Egyptian policies. When asked about the limitations of the
program he was in charge of, he simply would not acknowledge that there could be any
limitations.

There were also other limitations of this interview method. One of the major obstacles we
encountered while researching was that Egyptian officials interviewed did not seem very
knowledgeable about the work of their agencies. This was even the case with some of the senior
officials interviewed who had been in the same ministry for years; hence, interviews at times had

to be conducted with numerous employees of the same government body. This is a finding, in
and of itself though, as it definitely points to the nature of Egyptian institutions and points to the
desperate need for building their capacities.

Finally, a note must be said about the potentially incomprehensive nature of the data collected
about Egyptian government policies and initiatives. Although this thesis sought to report on all
Egyptian government policies and programs relevant to this thesis, we can imagine that we did
not manage to review 100 per cent of these initiatives .We did in fact include all the initiatives
we came across and feel like they give an accurate image of the current situation of Egyptian
government policies towards the diaspora and its human capital.

6.4 Further Research
Since looking into the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies and programs was out of
the scope of this research, we think that it would be interesting for future research to be aimed at
examining in depth the various policies and programs that we were able to identify through the
course of this research. A special focus on Egyptian institutions and their capacities would also
be enlightening. Furthermore, we think that examining the efforts of NGOs aimed at engaging
with the diaspora and specifically the highly skilled Egyptian diaspora would be especially
interesting since as we have seen throughout the course of this research there are numerous NGO
who engage in this. It would be especially interesting to see whether these initiatives can actually
act as an alternative to the currently flawed Egyptian government policies and programs. We also
think that further research should be conducted on the various Egyptian diaspora associations.
We believe that these associations could play a very large role in diaspora-homeland interaction
and in channeling the diaspora’s various forms of capital to Egypt for the purposes of

development. Finally, we recommend that research on the actual highly skilled Egyptian
diaspora be conducted in an effort to become better acquainted with the diaspora and in order to
understand how the various elements of Egyptian government diaspora policy affect them. The
diaspora’s perspective on this issue is crucial to understanding any successes or failures of
Egyptian government policy towards the diaspora and in formulating more appropriate and better
welcomed policies.
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